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Reforming Succession Law: Intestate Succession
It is traditional to characterise the law of succession as part of property law: the
teaching of succession within property classes at Scottish universities, which is
more or less ubiquitous, creates a mindset from which it is difficult to escape. The
practice is understandable because, after all, succession law provides the rules for
the transmission of property and it invariably requires deeds and conveyances to be
drawn up and sometimes involves conditions, burdens and different forms of title.
But at least in relation to intestate succession, it would be equally, or more, apt to
characterise succession as a part of family law. For the rules that have always applied
in Scotland are designed to identify the closest family relationships, and to strike
an appropriate balance between family members with differing relationships to the
deceased. Succession rights have always, literally, legitimated family relationships.
The Scottish Law Commission’s recent discussion paper on Succession1 is timely,
not because of any fundamental changes to the law of property, but because of shifting
understandings in the concept of “family”. Social changes such as increased levels
of divorce, second marriages and step relationships, and legal changes such as the
introduction of civil partnership and the recognition of the legitimacy of claims of
cohabitants, have rendered the carefully constructed complexities of the Succession
(Scotland) Act 1964 more and more out of touch with how family life in Scotland
operates today. The response of the Scottish Law Commission to the increased
diversity and complexity of family life is to seek a simpler set of rules, for only thus, it
believes, can anomalies and inconsistencies be avoided. The Commission does not
seek to challenge the principle of family-based intestate succession – indeed it is
difficult to envisage any practical alternative – but instead to recalibrate the balance of
interests between potential claimants. In the part of the discussion paper concerned
with intestate succession (part 2), the Commission limits its consideration to the
situation of a deceased who is survived by a spouse or civil partner. The clear winner
in its proposed recalibration is the spouse or civil partner; as we will see, it will usually
be the issue of the deceased who are the losers. It may be noted in passing that this
will be the second time in recent years that issue lose out in law reform, for the share
that cohabitants might now claim under section 29 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act
2006 will come from the portion that would otherwise have gone to issue.
1 Scot Law Com DP No 136 (2007); available on www.scotlawcom.gov.uk.
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A. OUTLINE OF THE PROPOSALS
Currently, when a person dies intestate survived by a spouse or civil partner, that
spouse or civil partner has a variety of different entitlements: prior rights, which
take precedence over all other claims and, subject to a financial limit, often exhaust
the whole estate; legal rights, which are shared with any issue of the deceased; and
rights under section 2 of the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, though these last are
postponed to preferred claimants including the deceased’s issue, siblings (or their
representatives, i.e. nephews and nieces) and parents. In its discussion paper, the
Scottish Law Commission proposes a much simpler approach, based on two all-
embracing propositions. First, where a person dies leaving a spouse or civil partner
but no issue, that surviving spouse or civil partner should simply take the whole estate,
whatever its nature and whatever its value.2 Secondly, where a person dies leaving
both spouse or civil partner and issue, the surviving spouse or civil partner should be
entitled to a fixed sum, tentatively set at £300,000, with the remainder being shared
with the issue. This would mean that the whole estate goes to the spouse or civil
partner where its value is less than the stated sum; if the estate’s value is more, the
excess would be divided equally with half going to the spouse or civil partner and the
other half being shared amongst the issue.3 In most cases this approach is likely to give
rather more than currently to the spouse or civil partner, though the discussion paper
provides some examples to show that the shift away from issue will often be modest.4
B. POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS
Following the traditional Scottish approach to intestate succession, which eschews
discretion and variation due to the actual circumstances of the family relationship
involved, the Scottish Law Commission is not keen on qualifications to its proposed
rules, arguing that individual family circumstances are likely to be so diverse that
subsidiary rules might not produce any more satisfactory results. This is sensible.
The fewer the subsidiary rules, the less scope for the disgruntled to seek a judicial
examination of the nature of his or her parents’ personal relationships. The presence
of absolute rules, fixed by the legal recognition of relationships, has insulated Scotland
from the bitterly fought family disputes for sometimes very modest successions that
are common in countries that allow courts to sit in judgment on the nature of
individual family relationships. This strongly inclines the Commission to propose that
the rules stated above should not be affected by the fact that the spouses or civil
partners had separated (either in fact or judicially): the actual state of the relationship
should be subsumed in its very existence.5
The Commission is only slightly less convinced on the question of whether
a child accepted by the deceased as a member of his or her family (typically a
step-child) should be treated in the same way as a blood child. The simplifying
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instinct of the Commission, which makes it incline to a negative answer, is sound.6
The concept of the “accepted child”, though well-known in, for example, the law of
aliment, is ill-fitted to the absolutist traditions of intestate succession where certainty
and predictability are far more important than in needs-based alimentary claims.
“Acceptance” is not determined by something as simple as a DNA test but by a
minute examination of how the family organised itself and the interrelationship
between its members. Perhaps an even more serious objection to giving step-
children and accepted children rights on intestacy is that that class of children would
then be entitled to two (or perhaps even more) inheritances: the more a family is
reconstituted, the more disparate will be the claims of children depending upon their
life-experiences. This would be bad social policy.
C. A MORE DIFFICULT SCENARIO
A major imperative of the Scottish Law Commission is to ensure general public
acceptance of how the rules on intestate succession operate. This is important not
because of a need for the law to reflect what people want, but because expectations
are the basis of what can reasonably be assumed to be intended by a person who dies
without a will. I have little doubt that the proposals so far discussed will usually meet
that imperative. But I am far less sure that the unqualified preference given to the
spouse or civil partner will be welcomed in some fairly common situations.
Imagine that a man – let us call him Abraham – marries Sarah while they are
young, and they have a child, Isaac. They live together for 30 or 40 years (acquiring
wealth, perhaps including family property inherited by Sarah from her parents). On
Sarah’s death most people would probably agree with the Commission that Abraham
should succeed to most or all of her estate. Isaac is likely to be content to wait for his
mother’s inheritance while his father still lives. But suppose further that, after some
years of lonely widowhood, Abraham meets and then marries Hagar, when they are
both in their declining years. On Abraham’s death it is Hagar and not Isaac who would
then take most of Abraham’s estate (including that portion to which he succeeded on
the death of Sarah). It is possible that Isaac might be persuaded to accept the justice
of this result as the cost to be borne for the years of his father’s twilight happiness, and
perhaps for the care and companionship Hagar relieved him from providing. But the
real problem comes when Hagar dies, because at that point all her property, including
that which was originally acquired by Sarah and Abraham, would, on the existing
law – which on this point is not affected by the current proposals – pass to her (by now
middle-aged) son (called, of course, Ishmael). Isaac gets nothing from his parents’
estates because, through marriage, it has all passed to Ishmael who had no blood
connection to either Sarah or Abraham. The heirlooms from Sarah’s family move out
of her family. It is not self-evident that this is a just outcome, or one acceptable to
Scottish society generally, or one that is justified by any principle identified by the
Law Commission – except the sterile tyranny of simplicity.
In reality this is not really a competition between surviving spouse or civil partner
and issue but between a first family (represented by issue) and a second family
6 Para 2.80.
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(represented by the surviving spouse) and it may well be that the balance of interests
in that situation needs to be struck differently from the balance in those intra-familial
competitions which will, presumably, be the norm. The Commission’s “inclination
at present” is to make no distinction between different types of surviving spouse or
civil partner, on the basis that “the range of possible situations is too great and it is
not clear that any new rule would produce more satisfactory results than [the one
being proposed]”.7 The Commission also points out that applying a different rule to
non-parental spouses would have the practical effect of making a sharp distinction
between spouses and civil partners, since the latter will seldom be shared (legal)
parents.
Taking the latter objection first, I am not sure that it is as strong as it sounds. In
the coming years, changes in the law (both adoption and human fertilisation) will
make it much more common for same-sex couples to be joint parents, and step-
relationships amongst opposite-sex couples already mean that substantial numbers
of married couples are not joint parents of the children they are bringing up. The
other objection is more substantial. In the example postulated above there is a clear
separation between the first family and the second family, but this will not always be
so and the variety of circumstances involving reconstituted families is almost infinitely
great. Hagar might have been the woman who brought Isaac up; Ishmael might have
been the son of Abraham and Hagar and half-brother of Isaac; Hagar might have
other children, now grown, who never lived in a family with Abraham; Abraham
might have other non-marital issue; Abraham’s first marriage might have lasted one
year, while his second lasted ten, or forty. Where, in other words, is the line to be
drawn between the claims of a first and those of a second (or subsequent) family,
and indeed where is the line between these families themselves? The Commission
has been unable to identify a clear principle upon which a departure from its simple,
spouse-takes-virtually-everything, rule might be based. And nor can I.
D. CONCLUSION
The lesson here is perhaps that, whatever rules are adopted for intestacy, they can
deal satisfactorily only with the norm, and that protection from an unjust result in
other cases can and must be sought through the simple expedient of making a will.
For it is to be remembered that intestacy rules are default rules, applicable only when
there has been a failure by the deceased to express his or her wishes in valid form.
It is to be hoped that when the new law, whatever its eventual shape, comes into
force, the Scottish government and the legal profession make serious efforts to advise,
encourage and persuade far more people to make a will than do so currently. Might
the celebrant of the marriage or civil partnership have a role in persuading any parent
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Reforming Succession Law: Legal Rights
The origins of legal rights are shrouded by the mists of time,1 but they have
functioned in Scots law for at least seven centuries as a form of family provision
whereby a surviving spouse (or, now, civil partner)2 and children of a deceased
person have an infeasible right to a one-half or one-third share of the moveable
estate, whether testate or intestate.3 They amount to a form of forced heirship under
which certain family members are considered as creditors of the deceased’s moveable
estate.4 In its recent discussion paper on Succession, the Scottish Law Commission
takes the view that legal rights should be abolished,5 thus maintaining and extending
the position adopted in 1990 in its unimplemented report on Succession.6 While the
Commission accepts that protection from disinheritance should remain part of the
law, it believes that, rather than treating surviving spouses, civil partners and children
in the same way, and ignoring cohabitants, such protection should be re-focused so
that the partnership aspect of adult relationships is given priority and the alimentary
obligations of the deceased towards his or her children enforced.
The discussion paper identifies four defects in the existing system of legal rights:
the value of the entitlement may be too great or too small; the distinction between
heritage and moveables is arbitrary and complex; in taking no account of needs,
resources or conduct, the current rules are too rigid and may lead to injustice; and,
finally, delays in making an election between testamentary provision and legal rights
may be prolonged by the operation of the long negative prescription. The character of
legal rights is thus presented as arbitrary, unprincipled and archaic. The paper goes
on to set out a package of provisional proposals which, taken together, constitute a
comprehensive, if fractured, overhaul of the current system. However, not all of the
defects identified by the Commission are resolved under its proposals for reform;
conversely, some of the more controversial reforms proposed – in particular, the
question of whether children of all ages ought to have a claim to a deceased parent’s
estate – do not relate to any of the defects at all.
1 On the likely origins of legal rights, see J C Gardner, The Origin and Nature of the Legal Rights of
Spouses and Children in the Scottish Law of Succession (1928); W D H Sellar, “Succession law in
Scotland – a historical perspective”, in K G C Reid, M J de Waal and R Zimmermann (eds), Exploring
the Law of Succession: Studies National, Historical and Comparative (2007) 49 at 55, 59-60.
2 A right identical to the right of surviving spouses at common law has been conferred on surviving civil
partners by the Civil Partnership Act 2004 s 131.
3 Where a person entitled to claim legal rights is also entitled to a legacy from the testate estate an election
must be made: see H Hiram, The Scots Law of Succession, 2nd edn (2007) paras 3.13-3.18.
4 Naismith v Boyes (1899) 1 F 79; Sanderson v Lockhart-Mure 1946 SC 298; Duncan v Duncan 2000
GWD 26-1012.
5 Scot Law Com DP No 136 (2007); available on www.scotlawcom.gov.uk. The proposals on legal rights
are contained in part 3. For a discussion of the proposals on intestate succession, found in part 2, see 77
above.
6 Scot Law Com No 124 (1990).
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A. THE PROPOSALS
Abolition by section 1 of the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 of the status of heir-
at-law, and the corresponding system of primogeniture which had dominated the
entire structure of the law of succession, rendered redundant any special treatment
of the heritable estate. This development is not referred to in the Scottish Law
Commission’s paper, but it lends weight to the argument that restricting family
provision to rights in the moveable estate is archaic. The Commission regards it as
axiomatic that claims by spouses, civil partners and children in relation to any of
the new rights proposed should be payable from the whole estate, heritable and
moveable. Given the strong opposition to the same proposal in 1990, and the fact
that similar objections are likely to be raised again, views are sought on whether
agricultural and business property ought to be excluded from the general principle
of assimilation.
As well as this structural change to the estate from which claims may be made,
three main changes are proposed to the forms of entitlement. First, where the
deceased dies testate,7 the legal rights of spouses and civil partners would be replaced
by a new entitlement, called legal share, amounting to 25% of what the claimant
would have been entitled to on intestacy. As with jus relicti and jus relictae under
the current law, the right would be available equally to separated spouses and civil
partners.8
Secondly, a cohabitant’s claim on intestacy under section 29 of the Family Law
(Scotland) Act would be extended to cases of testacy.
Thirdly, legitim would be abolished. In the Commission’s view, the right of adult
children to an automatic share of a parent’s estate is unjustifiable.9 But dependent
children (i.e. children under the age of 18, or 25 if in education or training, and
including those accepted as a child of the family) would have the right to claim aliment
from any part of the estate except for estate passing to a person who is already under
an obligation to aliment the child. The effect is to limit the power of a testator to
make testamentary provision for anyone other than dependent children unless the
beneficiary already has an obligation of aliment towards them. The form of the claim
would be an amalgam of common law aliment de jure representationis and aliment
under sections 1-7 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985: liability would arise in
similar cases to the former, while the method of assessment would be based on the
latter, subject to the crucial difference that any award would be payable as a capital
sum (by instalments, if appropriate) and variation or recall excluded. If this proposal
7 In cases of intestacy, surviving spouses and civil partners are to be provided for differently and
generously. See 77 above.
8 Except where the deceased was cohabiting at the date of death; in this case, the surviving cohabitant’s
claim would also be protected: paras 3.70-3.71.
9 Public opposition to this idea led to it being abandoned in the Scottish Law Commission’s earlier
Report on Succession (n 6), and it appears that there is still overwhelming public support for
the right of all children to a share of a parent’s (and step-parent’s) estate, though attitudes
differ as to whether as a fixed share or on application to the court: see Attitudes Towards
Succession Law: Findings of a Scottish Omnibus Survey (mruk Research, 2005; available on
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2005/07/18151328/13297) paras 2.14-2.24.
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should fail to gain support, the Commission proposes in the alternative that all the
deceased’s children, regardless of age, should be entitled to a 25% legal share of
what they would be entitled to between them if the deceased had died intestate.
This means that where the deceased is survived by a spouse or civil partner as well as
by children, the children would have the right to a legal share only where an estate
was worth more than $300, 000.
In addition, there are supplementary proposals. Part 4 of the paper suggests
anti-avoidance measures, such as exist in other jurisdictions10 and which apply in
Scots law on divorce or dissolution of marriage and civil partnership.11 In relation
to testate succession, this could perhaps be achieved by imposing personal liability
on the recipients of gifts made by the deceased inter vivos; in relation to intestate
succession, the doctrine of collation inter liberos could be adapted. It is also proposed
that the obscure rules relating to the prescription of claims be clarified12 and that
the prescriptive period for claims for legal share, a share of the intestate estate and
legacies should be 5 years. Claims by a dependent child should be competent until
the child ceases to be an alimentary creditor at 18 or 25; and the time limit for claims
by cohabitants should continue to be six months.
B. COMMENTARY
The Scottish Law Commission rejects the idea that the rights of spouses or civil
partners should depend on factors such as the duration of the relationship, the wealth
of the survivor, or whether this is a first or subsequent marriage. Rather, the public
commitment of marriage or civil partnership is evidence enough of the merits of
the claim. While this approach to entitlement is perfectly sound, it can be criticised
as suffering from the same failure to adjust it to individual relationships which the
Commission identified as a weakness of the current system of legal rights.
Coupled with the proposal to assimilate heritage and moveables, legal share has
the potential to be far more generous than legal rights and would avoid the kind of
situation illustrated recently in Pirie v Clydesdale Bank.13 Here, the deceased left the
family home to his daughter and his moveable estate to his wife and daughter between
them. Given that she would have received less by way of jus relictae than under the
will (one-third of the moveable estate rather than one-half), the only recourse open
to the widow was the somewhat artificial one of averring that her husband had been
subject to the undue influence of his daughter.14
In its 1990 report the Commission had recommended abolition of the right
to aliment from the executors or beneficiaries of a deceased parent’s estate
(aliment de jure representationis) on the ground that its continuing nature made it
10 For example, England and Wales, France, Ireland, New South Wales and certain states of the USA:
see para 4.5.
11 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 s 18; see para 4.11.
12 It appears that claims for prior and legal rights prescribe after 20 years but this is not set out expressly
in the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973.
13 [2005] CSOH 51, [2006] CSOH 82, 2007 SCLR 18.
14 Had her action been successful, the will would have been reduced and she would have been entitled
to prior rights under the rules of intestacy in addition to jus relictae.
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impracticable and onerous.15 The Commission now proposes its effective revival by
statute, with the previous objections seemingly resolved by changing it to a capital
payment, subject to the same factors as claims for aliment from a living person under
the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985. At least in theory, the whole estate remaining
after satisfaction of a claim for legal share may be claimed to fulfil the obligation.
The rationale is clear: while the deceased’s children ought not to be enriched at
the expense of their surviving parent, non-relatives ought not to be enriched to the
detriment of the children. The proposal seeks neatly to address the situation where
a testator leaves most or all of his or her estate to a partner who is not the parent of
the testator’s children, by transferring the testator’s obligations towards the children
to that partner.
While the proposals for legal share recognise that the purpose of jus relictae and
jus relicti is not maintenance but recognition of a kind of deferred community of
property, the proposals to replace legitim by aliment fail to do the same. By applying
a needs-based system, they deny to children legal recognition as family members.
However, the fluid form in which this proposal is framed results, potentially, in the
negation of freedom of testation. This does not appear to sit easily with the stated aim
of preserving a reasonable degree of testamentary freedom.16
Under the current law, children are entitled to aliment de jure representationis
in addition to, rather than instead of, the right to legitim, although in practice it is
rarely, if ever, claimed. If, instead of aliment, the Commission’s alternative proposal
were to be enacted – whereby all children are entitled to a legal share of 25% of the
estate remaining after a claim by a surviving spouse or civil partner for legal share
– there is no reason why some means could not be devised to encourage alimentary
claims under the existing law, in addition to legal share, in appropriate cases. The
practical problem with the Commission’s preference for a new type of aliment is that
it is difficult to see how the value of a capital payment, which cannot be varied for
future needs or circumstances and which in any event takes account of a number of
variables, can be assessed with any more accuracy or refinement than the apparently
blunter instrument of legal share.
The proposals relating to cohabitants are constrained by the Family Law (Scotland)
Act 2006 in as much as the Commission clearly does not consider it feasible to propose
root-and-branch reform in this area. It does propose, however, that claims from the
estate of a deceased cohabitant should be competent in testate as well as intestate
succession, on the basis not only of public opinion but also because “a cohabitant
is a member of the deceased’s immediate family to whom he or she is bound by
ties of love and affection”.17 The Commission further proposes that policy aims be
included within section 29 of the 2006 Act in order to assist the court in making an
appropriate award. These, the Commission suggests, should be similar to the aims
already set out in section 28(3), namely the recognition of financial and non-financial
contributions which benefited the deceased economically, and the economic burden
15 Report on Succession (n 6) recommendation 55.
16 See e.g. Discussion Paper on Succession (n 5) para 3.41.
17 Para 3.63.
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of childcare that the survivor will bear. The purpose of this proposal is to provide
a clear aim towards which the court may direct its discretion; its effect is to align
provision for cohabitants on death with the kind of award that may be made where
the relationship terminates during life.18 This approach is quite different to that taken
in respect of spouses and civil partners, where the value of legal shares may bear no
relation to the kind of award that might be made on divorce or dissolution – it may be
greater, but is more likely to be smaller. Divergence between the two regimes is one
of the consequences of maintaining the principle of fixed rights for spouses and civil
partners.
C. RULE-BASED AND COURT-BASED SCHEMES
In contrast to the uniform provision of the current law, the reformed scheme
combines different forms, types and values of provision, depending on the class of
claimant: a rule-based system is applied to surviving spouses and civil partners, a
discretionary, court-based system to cohabitants and dependent children. Given the
conflicts inherent in this area of the law, in terms of both human dynamics and moral
argumentation, the question of protection from disinheritance is one where there
cannot be right answers – or, possibly, wrong ones either. The divergence in provision
as between the Civil and the Common Law worlds is as likely to be reflective of
pragmatic compromises as to represent any superiority in one over the other.
The point of a system of fixed rights is that the sorts of questions that must be
asked in a discretionary system – questions about individual desert, individual need,
and the effect of an award on the collectivity of interested persons – can thereby
be avoided. While, however, the Scottish Law Commission identifies as one of the
defects of legal rights the fact that, depending on the value of the moveable estate,
either too much or too little protection may be offered to a surviving spouse, civil
partner or children, “regardless of the merits” of their claims,19 addressing questions
of merit is precisely what it wishes to avoid. Although fixed systems are said to be
“rigid” and “may lead to injustice” since they take no account of “needs, resources, or
conduct”, to replace legal rights with a discretionary system would, the Commission
states, entail uncertainty and inconvenience and the potential for litigants to make
“distasteful averments of past conduct” while adjusting to bereavement.20 However,
while a discretionary system would undoubtedly place a strain on the financial and
emotional resources of a surviving spouse or civil partner, this is no less likely in the
case of the cohabitants and children who, under the Commission’s proposals, would
be required to litigate to establish their claims.
18 Such an alignment resembles the position of spouses and civil partners under the Inheritance (Provision
for Family and Dependents) Act 1975 s 3(2), where the level of likely provision available on divorce or
dissolution must be considered in making an award on death.
19 Para 3.11.
20 Para 3.34. In England, the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975 takes precisely
these factors into account. For example, the duration of a marriage, referred to specifically in para 3.11
of the discussion paper, is one factor to be taken into account under s 3(2) of the 1975 Act: see for
example Cunliffe v Fielden [2006] Ch 361.
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The question of whether justice is best served by fixed or discretionary provision
or whether, in the end, there is much to choose between them, has been considered
several times before in relation to legal rights, not only by the Scottish Law
Commission but by legal academics. Michael Meston concluded that, despite the
undoubted merits of a discretionary system, decisions made under it would, if
applied consistently, “ossify into fixed rules”. Moreover, “a legislature which enacts
a discretionary system should perhaps recognise that it is merely avoiding the
responsibility of working out a comprehensive and sophisticated system of fixed
shares”.21 This may indeed be true, but the Commission’s proposed legal share can
be no more typified as “sophisticated” than can legal rights.
Neil MacCormick likewise has pointed out that decisions made under the English
discretionary rules may lead as indubitably to a particular distribution as the terms
of the Scots fixed rule; on the other hand, the advantages of clarity and predictability
may appear to be offset by their apparent unfairness in particular cases. Clarity and
predictability are not necessarily morally compelling. Rather, while Scots lawmay lead
to morally unexceptionable conclusions based on certain assumptions about family
structure and relationships, and about the propensity of testators to act reasonably,22
surely it is also the case that the English system will more probably get the morally right
and fair answer in more cases than the others, just because the court is given discretion to
take account of all the morally relevant factors with special weightings for some of them?
However the question of rights versus discretion is to be decided, the Scottish
Law Commission’s approach is to find merit in both: fixed shares are appropriate
for surviving spouses and civil partners, and discretionary awards for children and
cohabitants. It may be that there are persuasive reasons for applying different
regimes to different classes of claimant, but no overarching rationale is given. Rather,
the sorts of provision that ought to be available to each class of claimant are
treated independently of the other classes, and no specific justifications are given for
preferring certainty and convenience in one case and individual desert in another.
Hilary Hiram
University of Glasgow
EdinLR Vol 12 pp 86-93
DOI: 10.3366/E1364980908000103
Compensation for Commercial Agents: an end to
plucking figures from the air?
In the thirteen years since the Commercial Agents Directive was implemented in
the United Kingdom, courts have struggled with the concept of “compensation”
21 M Meston, “Succession – rights or discretion?” 1987 JR 1 at 11.
22 N MacCormick, “Discretion and rights” (1989) 8 Law and Philosophy 23 at 33-34.
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contained in the Directive.1 Compensation is one of two bases upon which a
commercial agent may receive an award from his principal on termination of the
commercial agency agreement (the other being indemnity). Until recently, King v
T Tunnock Ltd,2 a decision of an Extra Division of the Inner House, was the only
appellate-level decision in the UK on the calculation of compensation. As a result,
King became that rare species, a Scottish case frequently discussed in English judicial
proceedings. English courts have, in general, been critical of the approach adopted
by the Inner House, and in particular of the generosity of Mr King’s award. In
2007 the House of Lords decided an English appeal on compensation, Lonsdale v
Howard & Hallam Ltd.3 In Lonsdale, as earlier in King, the principal’s business had
gone into serious decline prior to termination of the agency, and the decision provides
important guidance, not only on compensation in general, but also on the impact that
the declining nature of the principal’s business has on the process of calculation.
A. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Two provisions in particular help to identify the aims of the Directive: the preamble,
and its source within the Treaty of Rome, art 117. The preamble refers to the
detrimental effect of different national laws on the protection available to commercial
agents vis-à-vis their principals. As such the Directive aims to create a level playing
field for commercial agents throughout Europe. Article 117 refers to the “need
to promote improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for
workers”. Implementation in the UK called for a marked shift in thinking. Hitherto,
the overriding tendency in agency law had been the protection of the principal: in
contrast to the agent’s extensive fiduciary duties, the principal’s duties towards the
agent were few in number.4 The Directive, by contrast, is intensely protective of
commercial agents.
The Directive involves partial rather than full harmonisation, giving member
states a choice between two types of payment on termination: “compensation”
or “indemnity”.5 The Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations,6 which
transpose the Directive for Great Britain, pass that choice on to the contracting
parties. Whilst indemnity can be opted into in the commercial agency agreement,
compensation applies if the agreement is silent.7 Given that the Regulations apply
to all agreements in force on 1 January 1994, compensation is thus the rule for most
agreements.
1 Council Directive 86/653 OJ 1986 L382/17 on the co-ordination of the laws of Member States relating
to self-employed commercial agents.
2 2000 SC 424.
3 [2007] UKHL 32, [2007] 1 WLR 2055.
4 See L Macgregor, “Agency and Mandate”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia,
Reissue (2002) paras 102-124.
5 Art 17.
6 SI 1993/3053. For Northern Ireland, see the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations
(Northern Ireland) 1993, SR 1993/483.
7 Reg 17(2).
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Compensation and indemnity are quite distinct. The former is drawn from French
law8 and the latter from German law.9 In the case of indemnity, the commercial agent
is entitled to a payment:10
if and to the extent that he has brought the principal new customers or has significantly
increased the volume of business with existing customers and the principal continues to
derive substantial benefits from the business with such customers.
As such, it seeks to anticipate the gains which might be made by the principal in
the future by virtue of the commercial agent’s efforts, and to claw back a proportion
of those gains for the commercial agent. The definition of compensation in the
Regulations11 (and Directive) is short and uninformative, but includes two sets of
circumstances in which relevant damage is deemed to occur. In the earlier stages
of King it was stated that these situations were exhaustive of the possibilities,
but the Inner House later confirmed that they were no more than examples.12
Only in the case of indemnity must payment be “equitable having regard to all
the circumstances”, and only indemnity is subject to a maximum of one year’s
commission.13
B. KING v TUNNOCK
The facts of this case are memorable, involving the decline in the fortunes
of Scotland’s most famous confectionery manufacturers and the closure of their
Uddingston bakery. As a result, Tunnocks terminated their relationship of more than
30 years with Mr King. This was no doubt keenly felt by him, especially as his father
had worked as a Tunnock’s agent before him. Because the agency contract was silent
on the issue of payment on termination, compensation automatically applied under
the 1993 Regulations.14
At first instance, the sheriff refused compensation, and this finding was confirmed
by the sheriff principal on appeal.15 Lord Caplan, delivering the opinion of the Inner
House,16 began by considering reg 17(6) of the 1993 Regulations: “the commercial
agent shall be entitled to compensation for the damage he suffers as a result of the
termination of his relations with his principal.” He concluded from the use of the
present tense for “suffers” that damage is calculated at the moment of termination.
In effect, the agent has lost an asset with commercial value.17 Later in his opinion
when he came to value the loss, it was clearly significant to Lord Caplan that the
agent’s business was likely to have “enjoyed considerable goodwill.”18
8 Originally based on decree n.58-1345 of 23 Dec 1958.
9 Handelsgesetzbuch § 89(b).
10 Reg 17(3)(a).
11 Reg 17(6), (7).
12 2000 SC 424 at para 42.
13 Reg 17(3)(b), (4).
14 Reg 17(2).
15 1996 SCLR 742.
16 2000 SC 424.
17 Para 38.
18 Para 50.
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Lord Caplan was at pains to emphasise that compensation does not seek to value
the agent’s loss of future commissions suffered due to severance of the agreement.
“Damage” under the regulations, he suggested, should not be confused with
“damages” payable at common law for breach of contract.19 After all, compensation is
not confined to cases of the principal’s breach. It is payable where the agent himself
has terminated because he can no longer work due to ill-health or age,20 and also
where his agency agreement was a fixed-term one which has now expired.21 It is also
payable to his estate on his death.22 Significantly, in view of the turn of events in the
House of Lords in Lonsdale, Lord Caplan warned against confusing compensation
with indemnity. The calculation of indemnity involves looking into the future, at the
financial gains the principal could expect to make which are attributable to the agent’s
efforts.23 Compensation has no similar forward-looking thrust.
When calculating compensation, Lord Caplan drew extensively on practice in
French law, where courts tend to award two years’ gross commission. Whilst
acknowledging that French law provided only a guide or benchmark, he concluded
that the court was not precluded from considering what would happen in France:24
[T]he rulings of a judicial system applying the same legislation (intended indeed to operate
in the same way between the relevant systems) must be entitled to some respect.
Compensation remained payable despite the failing nature of the principal’s business.
In a passage quoted in many of the later English decisions, Lord Caplan stated that
“so far as entitlement to compensation is concerned, the Directive is not troubled
with what happens after the date of termination”.25 Noting that the pursuer would
have “expected and required a relatively high level of compensation to surrender his
successful and long-established agency,”26 the court awarded the sum of £27,144.
This was, in effect, two years’ gross commission.
As was later to be noted in Lonsdale, not without implied criticism,27 this result
was reached without the benefit of expert evidence valuing the agent’s business at
the moment of termination. Its absence can be easily explained. Mr King’s legal
team, misunderstanding the impact of the relatively new Regulations, had originally
sought to claim the commission which would have been due had the agency not been
terminated (on analogy with breach of contract). As the case changed its emphasis
only on appeal, no valuation evidence was ever led.
19 Para 38.
20 Reg 18(b)(ii).
21 Frape v Emerco International Ltd 2002 SLT 371; Light v Ty Europe Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1238,
[2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 693 at para 32 per Tuckey LJ; Tigana v Decoro Ltd [2003] EWHC 23 (QB),






27 [2007] 1 WLR 2055 at para 26 per Lord Hoffmann.
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C. LONSDALE v HOWARD & HALLAM LTD
As already mentioned, the facts of Lonsdale are similar to those of King, although the
principal’s business in Lonsdale seems to have been in more serious decline. Lord
Hoffmann delivered the only speech in what was a unanimous decision. As in King,
Lord Hoffmann focused on reg 17(6), and discussed how the equivalent provisions
are applied in France.28 He explained that the agent’s entitlement to compensation
arises because, at the moment of termination, the agent in effect “hands back” the
goodwill in the principal’s business which that agent has helped to create.29 Strictly
speaking, therefore, a proportion of the goodwill ought to be attributed to the agent;
but because of the difficulties involved in such attribution, the French courts have,
rather, sought to place a value on the “right to be an agent”.30
At this point, the similarities between the cases end. Lord Hoffmann equated the
agent’s loss with the open-market sale value of the agency, the value of which “lies in
the prospect of earning commission, the agent’s expectation that ‘proper performance
of the agency contract’ will provide him with a future income stream.”31 He supported
his view by reference to the leading text, S Saintier and J Scholes, Commercial Agents
and the Law.32 Oddly, however, those writers make no such a statement on the pages
cited by LordHoffmann, and it could even be said that his interpretation is contrary to
the whole tenor of the relevant chapter in the book. Indeed, in a more recent article,
Saintier criticised the Court of Appeal in Lonsdale for taking exactly this approach,
arguing that it risked confusion of compensation with indemnity.33
Counsel for Lonsdale had sought to persuade the judges to apply the French
approach of awarding two years’ gross commission. He further submitted that, if
their Lordships did not agree on this point, a reference should be made to the Court
of Justice for a preliminary ruling. Lord Hoffmann dismissed this submission on
several grounds. He referred to Honeyvem Informazioni Commerciali Srl v Mariella
De Zotti,34 where the European Court of Justice held that the national court enjoys
a margin of discretion in relation to calculation of indemnity. A further reason was
the difference in market conditions between France and England. In France there
is a market for trade in commercial agencies and the premium usually paid is two
years’ gross commission. This provides a clear rationale for the use of this amount
as a guideline in France. In England, according to Lord Hoffmann, there is “no
such market”. Whether this statement is accurate is difficult to say.35 No supporting
evidence on this point was cited to Lord Hoffmann, or volunteered by him.
28 The particular piece of French legislation is art 12, Loi no 91-593 du 25 juin 1991 relative aux rapports




32 (2005) 187-188, referred to by Lord Hoffmann at para 10.
33 S Saintier, “The principles behind the assessment of the compensation option under the Agency
Regulations: clarity at last” [2007] JBL 90 at 94.
34 [2006] ECR I-02879 at paras 34-36.
35 Although see S Saintier and J Scholes, Commercial Agents and the Law (2005) 187 where a similar
statement is made, unsupported by evidence.
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Towards the end of his speech Lord Hoffmann criticised the conclusion reached
by the Inner House in King, commenting:36
I respectfully think that the sheriff was right. In view of the closure of the business, the
agency was worth nothing. No one would have given anything for the right to earn future
commission on the sales of cakes and biscuits because there would be none to be sold.
Nor had the principal retained any goodwill which the agent had helped to build up. The
goodwill disappeared when the business closed.
Lord Hoffmann’s emphasis on the declining nature of the principal’s business had a
catastrophic effect on the quantum of compensation. At first instance Mr Lonsdale
had been awarded a mere £5,000. Like the Court of Appeal before it,37 the House of
Lords upheld this award, although hinting that the first instance judge could not have
been faulted had he simply dismissed the claim.38
D. ANALYSIS
One could argue that the decision in Lonsdale is a simple application of the European
Court of Justice decision in Honeyvem.39 In terms of the principle of national
autonomy, a member state is entitled to determine the conditions under which a right
granted by European Community law is to be enforced.40 There are, of course, limits
to that margin of discretion. National enforcement procedures must not threaten the
effectiveness of EC law.41 The balance between the autonomy of the member state
and the need to ensure the effectiveness of EC law is a complex issue which cannot
be fully analysed here. Nevertheless, it is suggested that the decision in Lonsdale
comes close to upsetting this delicate balance. It means that an agent working in
Great Britain will be denied the compensation to which he would have been entitled
had he worked in another member state of the European Union where compensation
applies. This provides obvious cause for concern. Admittedly, the Directive only
intended to achieve partial harmonisation. But while diversity in the size of award
is one thing, the outright denial of an award is quite another. Presently, agents whose
entitlements arise when they choose to terminate their agreements for reasons of
illness or age do not have their awards valued by reference to prospective commission.
Is the failure of the principal’s business not an equally random event, lying similarly
beyond the power of the agent?
As narrated above, the traditional approach in the UK has not been to identify
commercial agents as in need of protection. Yet, the facts of cases such as King and
36 Para 23.
37 [2006] EWCA Civ 63, [2006] 1 WLR 1281.
38 Para 34.
39 Honeyvem Informazioni Commerciali Srl v Mariella De Zotti [2006] ECR I-02879 at paras 34-36.
40 For the development of this principle see, for example, Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-
Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989; Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck,
Van Campenhout & Cie v Belgian State [1995] ECR I-4599; Cases C-430-431/93 Van Schijndel & Van
Veen v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten [1995] ECR I-4705; P Craig and G de Búrca,
EU Law Text Cases and Materials, 4th edn (2008) 305 ff.
41 Craig & de Búrca, EU Law Text Cases and Materials (n 40) 313 ff.
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Lonsdale suggest that there is a class of agents working in this country whose earnings
are low. Speaking of Mr Lonsdale, Lord Hoffmann questioned why the court should
compensate for the loss of a business “which earned him less than he would have
been paid as a bus conductor.”42 But it may indeed be such agents who are most in
need of protection, and whom the Directive is designed to protect.
There are, of course, conceptual difficulties in the valuation of an agent’s business
without reference to a catastrophic event such as the principal’s insolvency. But when
one considers the intensely protective background to the Directive, it seems logical
to disregard the declining business in the valuation exercise. That was the approach
taken in King and in some English cases. Judge Morland in Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton
Leonard43 decided not to use the level of commission earned in the last year of the
agency to calculate compensation and was commended by Saintier for doing so.44
The final year’s figures would not, he concluded, have been representative of the true
value of the volume of sales. After Lonsdale, however, this case is no longer good law.
The method used by Lord Hoffmann is, in any event, a curious one. He
used French law to reach what is, it is argued here, an erroneous conclusion, by
equating compensation with a right to future commissions.45 But later in his speech
he distanced himself from the French practice of using the figure of two years’
commission as a guideline. Speaking of the earlier stages of the case, he criticised
the fact that the judge was invited “to pluck a figure out of the air from across
the Channel.”46 One might argue that to use certain elements of the French legal
approach but reject others is an equally random approach.
Nor is Lord Hoffmann’s approach consistent with the leading English agency text,
Bowstead & Reynolds. Reynolds, describing assessment of the agent’s loss as part of
the exercise of calculating compensation, states:47
This on the whole, but not exclusively, involves looking backward rather than forward (but
without referring to how long the agency has continued nor to benefits conferred on the
principal.)
It seems clear that, with their decision in Lonsdale, the House of Lords has set the
law on a new and uncharted path.
At a practical level, the decision is likely to prove equally unwelcome. Legal
advisers on both sides may struggle to understand why aspects of indemnity now
apply to compensation. Although the ability to refer to French law has been placed
beyond doubt, no one acting for the agent is likely to do so because of Lord
42 Para 23.
43 [2002] ECC 5.
44 See S Saintier, Commercial Agency Law: A Comparative Analysis (2002) 255.
45 Para 10.
46 Para 35.
47 F M B Reynolds, Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency Law, 18th edn (2006) para 11-049. The reference
to “not exclusively” seems to refer to the fact that loss is not always limited to valuation of goodwill but
may also include expenses which the agent has incurred in setting up the agency on the advice of the
principal which he has been unable to amortize because of the termination of the agency relationship.
See para 11-050, and also para 11-050 where Reynolds notes that “cases which pay too close attention
to deprivation of future net commission may be regarded as doubtful.”
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Hoffmann’s comments contrasting the market for commercial agencies in England
and in France. There are also cost implications as it will now be necessary to call
expert valuation evidence. Indeed the cost of such evidence may exceed the expected
award, remembering that many of these cases involve low-earning agents.
To conclude, a few words are offered on the status of Lonsdale as a precedent for
Scots law. As a decision of the House of Lords in an English appeal on legislation
applying equally to Scotland, it is at least highly persuasive, if not binding.48 Only
the very brave (or foolish) would seek to argue against it, particularly given that
Lord Rodger voiced his approval of Lord Hoffmann’s speech. Nevertheless, it is not
beyond the bounds of possibility that a Scottish judge might conclude, as has been
argued here, that the decision in Lonsdale undermines the purpose of the Directive.
Certainly it is to be hoped that Lonsdale does not mark the end of discussion of King
in the Scottish courts.
Laura Macgregor
University of Edinburgh
The author would like to thank Dr Séverine Saintier for commenting on a draft of
this note.
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The Unfair Prejudice Remedy
Wilson v Jaymarke Estates Ltd,1 the first Scottish appeal concerning section 459 of
the Companies Act 1985 to reach the House of Lords, gave the House a second
opportunity to consider the provision, eight years after O’Neill v Phillips.2 Wilson
is likely to be remembered, however, not for its discussion of section 459 but for
remarks concerning the process of appeal from Scotland. A couple of months earlier,
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council also heard an appeal concerning the
protection provided to shareholders against unfairly prejudicial conduct. This appeal
came from Jersey and concerned a statutory provision identical in substance to section
459. The Committee’s opinion in Gamlestaden Fastigheter AV v Baltic Partners
Ltd.3 will be of interest in Scotland (and England) because explicit reference was
made to section 459. This note analyses and explains the significance of Wilson and
Gamlestaden.
48 SeeDalgleish v Glasgow Corporation 1976 SC 32; GMaher and T B Smith, “Sources of Law (Formal)”,
in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol 22 (1987) para 280.
1 [2007] UKHL 29, 2007 SLT 958.
2 [1999] 1 WLR 1092.
3 [2007] UKPC 26, [2007] 4 All ER 164.
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A. THE STATUTORY REMEDY
Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 provides minority shareholders with their
principal form of statutory protection.4 Effective from 1 October 2007 but identical
to its predecessor (section 459 of the Companies Act 1985), section 994 enables a
shareholder to petition the court for relief where the affairs of the company are being
(or have been) conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to his interests or to the
interests of shareholders generally. The prejudice must be suffered qua shareholder
and not some other capacity.5
Both unfairness and prejudice must be established but neither is defined. In
this regard, the most important decision on section 459 is O’Neill, in which
Lord Hoffmann articulated a twofold test of unfairness that has been accepted as
authoritative in Scotland, although its application is not without its difficulties.6 In
Lord Hoffman’s view, unfairness arises where there is a breach of the terms on which
it was agreed that the company’s affairs would be conducted, or where a majority
exercises a legal power in a manner regarded by equity as contrary to good faith.
Lord Hoffmann also recognised that unfairness could arise where an event occurs
which “puts an end to the basis upon which the parties entered into association
with each other, making it unfair that one shareholder should insist upon the
continuance of the association”.7 Moreover, in Scotland it has been recognised that
under section 459 the court can give effect to “recognised restraints on the exercise
of rights or powers – such as . . . for example, on personal bar or acquiescence or
waiver”.8
Lord Hoffmann’s opinion in O’Neill represented the refined articulation of an
approach he had developed earlier in the Court of Appeal9 and High Court.10
These earlier decisions are significant for another reason: they established the
remedy’s success through purposive interpretation, particularly concerning the broad
interpretation of the qua member requirement and the recognition that the nature
of a shareholder’s participation in a company can be broader than his strict legal
rights.11
Section 996 of the 2006 Act enables the court to make “such order as it thinks fit
for giving relief”. The most popular is the purchase of the petitioning shareholder’s
shares by the company or majority shareholders. Other orders include regulating the
future affairs of the company or restraining the company from altering its articles
4 The remedy’s pivotal role is unlikely to diminish following the introduction of statutory derivative
proceedings in Scotland (described as a derivative claim in England and Wales). See Companies Act
2006 ss 265-269 (Scotland), ss 260-264 (England Wales).
5 See Brown v Scottish Border Springs Ltd 2002 SLT 1213, following an earlier English decision,
J E Cade & Son Ltd [1991] BCC 360.
6 See, e.g., Hall v Gamut Technologies Ltd 1999 SLT 1276; Anderson v Hogg 2002 SC 190. For further
discussion see R Goddard, “Shareholder remedies in Scotland” (2003) 7 EdinLR 93.
7 [1999] 1 WLR 1092 at 1101.
8 Anderson v Hogg 2002 SC 190 at para 5 per Lord Hamilton.
9 See, e.g., Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14.
10 See, e.g., Re a Company [1986] BCLC 376.
11 In this respect Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries [1973] AC 360 has been influential.
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of association without court approval. In Gamlestaden, the order sought was one
requiring the company’s directors to pay damages to the company. In Wilson, as we
shall now see, the order sought was the purchase of the minority’s shares.
B. WILSON
Wilson was a minority shareholder (30%) in a company formed with another
shareholder (Shaw) who held the remaining shares. Wilson petitioned for relief under
section 459, making several allegations of unfairly prejudicial conduct. These included
Shaw’s unilateral payment of company funds to another company in which his son
was interested; the levying on the company of management charges (in excess of
£200,000) payable to other companies in which Shaw was interested, where the
company derived no benefit; and the failure to hold annual general meetings. At first
instance the sheriff found that the affairs of the company had been conducted in an
unfairly prejudicial manner and ordered that Shaw purchase Wilson’s shares.12 This
decision was upheld by the First Division on appeal.13 Several days were allotted
for the further appeal to the House of Lords,14 but in the event only a few hours
were needed. The main point argument for the appellant was that the management
charges were not unfairly prejudicial because Wilson had previously consented to
similar payments. In rejecting the appeal, Lords Hoffmann and Hope (delivering
the only reasoned opinions, with which Lords Rodger, Walker and Carswell agreed)
expressed surprise that the case had reached the House. Lord Hope emphasised that
the limits on the right of appeal to the House of Lords must be “carefully and jealously
respected”,15 particularly the restriction to questions of law and the requirement to
give a proper estimate of the time needed. Lord Hope was not satisfied that counsel
had given proper attention to these matters.
Although Wilson did not raise any novel question of law, it demonstrates the
significance of the relationship between shareholders for the purposes of determining
unfairness. Conduct that is fair whilst mutual trust exists between the parties may
be unfair where that trust is destroyed. A shareholder’s agreement that payments
should be made, or that the company should be run informally, will not be absolute.
Lord President Cullen’s opinion in Wilson was undisturbed by the House of Lords
and remains a leading Scottish authority. Although it is not suggested that the Lord
President reached the wrong decision, two points about his opinion seem worth
making.
The Lord President cited O’Neill and stated that “[a] member of a company will
be entitled to complain of unfairness where there has been some breach of the
terms on which he agreed that the affairs of the company should be conducted, or
where the rules have been used in a manner that equity would regard as contrary
to good faith”.16 He added, with reference to Re Legal Costs Negotiators Ltd
12 2002 GWD 28-962.
13 [2005] CSIH 84, 2006 SCLR 510.
14 [2007] UKHL 29, 2007 SLT 958.
15 Para 20.
16 2006 SCLR 510 at para 10.
96 the edinburgh law review Vol 12 2008
(an English decision handed down prior to O’Neill),17 that in quasi-partnership
companies “legitimate expectations can exist and can render the use of powers
unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members”.18 The relationship between these
propositions requires consideration. O’Neill makes clear that legitimate expectations
arise only where equitable principles make it unfair to exercise strict legal rights. As
Lord Hoffmann explained, the legitimate expectation “is a consequence, not a cause,
of the equitable constraint”.19 To be consistent with O’Neill, the Lord President’s
statement concerning legitimate expectations must be seen as an illustration of the
manner in which equitable principles restrain the exercise of strict legal powers;
it cannot be regarded as a free-standing proposition. Indeed, as Lord Hoffmann
recognised in O’Neill, it is probably best to avoid the term “legitimate expectation”
altogether.20
The second point concerns the Lord President’s statement, with reference to
another English case (Re Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd),21 that:22
Section 459 is designed for the protection of the members of companies. It is in that capacity
that they seek its protection, not as directors or employees.
This is the quamember requirement but its boundaries are not as precise as the Lord
President’s statement suggests. Conduct affecting a shareholder in another capacity
can, in certain cases, be unfairly prejudicial to his interests qua shareholder. The
classic example is a shareholder’s removal from the office of director by an ordinary
resolution under section 168 of the 2006 Act. This will be unfairly prejudicial where
there was an understanding between the shareholders that he would participate in
decision-making and continue to be involved with the management of the company.
The expectation of participation is therefore an essential part of the shareholder’s
interests in the company. Such understandings are common in so-called quasi-
partnership-type companies and their existence enables the court to subject the
exercise of legal powers to equitable considerations. How far this should go is less
clear. Whether the interests capable of protection under section 459 should include
the shareholder’s interests as a creditor of the company was the question considered
in Gamlestaden.
C. GAMLESTADEN
The key issues in Gamlestaden concerned Jersey’s unfair prejudice remedy (arts 141
and 143 of the Companies (Jersey) Law 1991) which is identical in substance to
sections 994 and 996 of the 2006 Act.23 Gamlestaden was a minority shareholder
in Baltic Partners Ltd, a company incorporated in Jersey and formed for the purpose
17 [1999] 2 BCLC 171.
18 2006 SCLR 510 at para 10.
19 [1999] 1 WLR 1092 at 1102.
20 Lord Hoffmann used the term in Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc [1995] 1 BCLC 14.
21 [2002] EWCA Civ 1740, [2003] 1 BCLC 76.
22 2006 SCLR 510 at para 11.
23 The only differences concern grammar and the choice of some words.
Vol 12 2008 analysis 97
of a joint venture. Gamlestaden loaned Baltic money. When Baltic became insolvent,
Gamlestaden brought an action under art 141, alleging breaches of directors’ duties
and seeking an order that the directors pay damages to Baltic. The Jersey Court of
Appeal24 upheld the Bailiff’s decision to strike out the action because no relief could
be granted which would benefit Gamlestaden qua shareholder; only the creditors
(including Gamlestaden) would benefit. The Privy Council rejected the Jersey Court
of Appeal’s interpretation and stated that art 141 “properly construed [does] not
ipso facto rule out the grant of relief simply on the ground that the relief sought
will not benefit the applicant in his capacity as member”.25
The order sought by Gamlestaden was the payment of damages to Baltic in respect
of harm suffered by the company. With reference to Re Chime Corp Ltd,26 the Privy
Council accepted that such an order could be made. This is consistent with the
position in Scotland and England,27 although the issue remains controversial given
the long-standing principle that the company is the proper pursuer where it has
suffered harm.28 That breaches of directors’ duties can form the basis of a successful
claim under section 994 is also consistent with the twofold test of unfairness outlined
by Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill v Phillips29 and accepted as relevant in Jersey.30
In Gamlestaden it was argued that shareholders only have standing to bring an
action under art 141 where the relief would benefit them qua shareholder. The Privy
Council rejected this argument and, with reference to the English decision R&H
Electric Ltd v Haden Bill Electrical Ltd,31 stated that it was:32
somewhat artificial to insist that the qualifying loss for Article 141 (or section 459) purposes,
must be loss which has reduced the value of the investor’s equity capital and that it is not
sufficient to show that it has reduced the recoverability of the investor’s loan capital.
The Privy Council added that:33
in a case where an investor in a joint venture company has, in pursuance of the joint venture
agreement, invested not only in subscribing for shares but also in advancing loan capital, the
investor ought not, in their Lordships’ opinion, [to] be precluded from the grant of relief
under Article 143(1) (or section 461(1)) on the ground that the relief would benefit the
investor only as loan creditor and not as member.
The Privy Council rightly rejected the arguments that relief could only be granted
where it would benefit the shareholder qua shareholder and that the prejudice must
24 [2005] JLR 57.
25 [2007] UKPC 26, [2007] 4 All ER 164 at para 36. The judgment was delivered by Lord Scott of Foscote.
26 (2004) 7 Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Reports 546.
27 See e.g., Anderson v Hogg 2002 S C 190; Re Bhullar Bros [2003] EWCA Civ 424, [2003] 2 BCLC 241;
Clark v Cutland [2003] EWCA Civ 810, [2004] 1 WLR 783.
28 For further discussion see J Payne, “Sections 459-461 Companies Act 1985 in flux: the future of
shareholder protection” (2005) 64 CLJ 647.
29 [1999] 1 WLR 1092.
30 See, e.g., Robertson v Slous [2002] JLR 361.
31 [1995] 2 BCLC 280.
32 [2007] UKPC 26 at para 30.
33 Para 37.
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have reduced the value of the shareholder’s equity. But it does not follow, as the
Privy Council’s opinion implies, that if the relief does not benefit the shareholder
qua shareholder it must do so in some other capacity such as a creditor. Article 141
and section 994 do not require this. For example, where a director is ordered to
disgorge a gain made in breach of fiduciary duty, the shareholders do not directly
benefit; yet there is no reason why relief should be precluded on this basis. Moreover,
shareholders’ interests can be prejudiced in ways that do not reduce the value of
their equity investment. The authorities confirm this point: in Re Elgindata Ltd,34
a case concerning alleged mismanagement, Warner J held that a reduction in the
value of equity was not the only way of establishing that conduct was prejudicial
to a shareholder’s interests. Actions placing the value of the shareholders’ equity in
jeopardy can also be prejudicial.35 These points were not fully explored by the Privy
Council. They are important because they suggest that whether a shareholder benefits
directly from the art 143 relief should not be determinative of the shareholder’s
standing to bring an action.
The Privy Council did not expound a general rule that shareholders who are also
creditors can use article 141 (or section 994) to protect their interests qua creditor.
It would be difficult to support such a rule because the purpose of the remedy is to
protect the interests of shareholders in that capacity. Creditors (including employees)
have contractual remedies available to them that shareholders do not, and in Scotland
and England the courts have confirmed that section 994 should not be used by
shareholders to pursue interests unconnected with their capacity as a shareholder
of the company.36
The Privy Council nevertheless recognised that in some companies the nature of
a shareholder’s participation will not be fully reflected in the legal rights conferred
qua shareholder. This is consistent with O’Neill, in which Lord Hoffmann observed
that “the requirement that prejudice must be suffered as a member should not be
narrowly or technically construed”.37 This broad interpretation explains the success
of section 994 in small, so-called quasi-partnership companies. However, the fact
that the company is small, or has few shareholders, is not sufficient in itself for
the recognition of interests and expectations beyond the shareholder’s legal rights.
Something more is required, as illustrated by the facts of R&H Electric Ltd v Haden
Bill Electrical Ltd.38 At the time that Haden Bill was formed it was agreed that a
minority shareholder would participate in management for as long as a company
under his control (R&H) remained a creditor. When, later, the shareholder was
removed as director, the fact that Haden Bill was formed on the basis of mutual
trust and confidence enabled the court to provide relief under section 459. The trial
judge held that the fact the shareholder and R&H were separate did not preclude
34 [1991] BCLC 959.
35 Re R A Noble (Clothing) Ltd [1983] BCLC 273.
36 See, e.g., Brown v Scottish Border Springs Ltd 2002 SLT 1213,Wright v J & AMitchell & Co Ltd 1996
GWD 32-1303, [1997] BCC 198; Re John Reid & Sons (Strucsteel) Ltd [2003] 2 BCLC 319.
37 [1999] 1 WLR 1092 at 1105.
38 [1995] 2 BCLC 280.
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relief and that the court should take a broad view of a shareholder’s interests qua
member.
The facts of Gamlestaden were very different from those in R&H Electric Ltd, not
least because there was no evidence that Baltic was formed on the basis of mutual
trust and confidence. It is therefore not clear on what basis the Privy Council held
that Gamlestaden’s interests qua shareholder were capable of including its interests
qua creditor. The decisions cited by their Lordships were not fully analysed, and
general statements from the (English) cases to which the Privy Council referred
– such as Arden J’s view that the section 459 jurisdiction has an “elastic quality”39
– do not by themselves justify an expansive view of shareholders’ interests. Their
Lordships nevertheless suggest that in a joint venture a shareholder’s interests capable
of protection under section 459 (now section 994 of the 2006 Act) can include his
interests qua creditor without the need for establishing that the relationship was
formed on the basis of mutual trust and confidence.
The extent to which such a broad interpretation was necessary can be questioned.
Where a company has suffered harm there is nothing in art 141 or section 994 which
says that the shareholder must directly benefit from the relief sought. Moreover,
several important questions remain unanswered. First, what financing arrangements
will constitute a joint venture? The fact that a shareholder has provided a loan should
not imply that there is a joint venture; but what weight should be attached to the
proportion of the shareholder’s investment that is advanced in this way? Secondly,
directors may take a decision in the interests of the company (to which their legal
duties are owed) which conflicts with the interests of a loan creditor. Should the unfair
prejudice remedy be used as a means of resolving conflicts between shareholders qua
loan creditors and the company as a separate legal entity?
Robert Goddard
Aston University
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Causation and Apportionment of Damages in Cases
of Divisible Injury
Scots law has been responsible for some of the seminal cases on the proper test for
causation of loss. In Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings1 the House of Lords settled
the point that, for a defender to be shown to have caused a pursuer’s injury, it is not
necessary that the defender was the sole cause of the injury, but merely that, but
for the defender’s conduct, the injury would not have occurred to the same extent.
To put it another way, it need only be shown that the defender made a “material
39 Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 354.
1 1956 SC (HL) 26.
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contribution” to the totality of the pursuer’s losses. Subsequently, in McGhee v
National Coal Board,2 the House of Lords developed a further test for causation, the
material increase in risk test, by which a defender could be shown to have caused
an injury by virtue of the fact that it materially increased the risk of the injury’s
occurrence. Although dressed up as a mere variation of the material contribution
test, this development was in fact a radical one, for it established that risk creation
alone, rather than any “but for” connection to actual harm, could be used to prove a
causal link.3
While both Wardlaw and McGhee were groundbreaking decisions, they did
not address a further fundamental issue: what should be the liability in damages
of a defender who has materially contributed to an injury? This is an issue of
apportionment not causation.
A. THEWARDLAW LACUNA
InWardlaw liability was imposed for the whole of the pursuer’s losses even though the
defender’s culpable behaviour had not been the only cause of the pursuer’s injuries.
The fairness of such a result is questionable. In McGhee, a justification for such a
finding of liability could be argued to lie in the fact that the disease (dermatitis)
was a so-called “indivisible injury”, in that the totality of the harm caused could
not be divided into portions attributable to either of its two possible causes. Each
causal contribution could therefore be said to be a cause of the whole indivisible
loss. In Wardlaw, however, the pursuer had contracted pneumoconiosis, a divisible,
dose-related disease, the severity of which was affected by the length and severity
of exposure to the harmful agent. The disease had been caused by the pursuer’s
exposure to noxious dust created by a number of different machines in the defender’s
factory. It was held that the defender had been negligent only in respect of the dust
produced by two types of machine, but not the third which had also thrown material
quantities of dust into the air. The House of Lords concluded that, as the machines
for which the defender was liable had themselves produced a substantial amount of
dust, which must (their Lordships inferred) have contributed to the pursuer’s illness,
the defender’s negligence had therefore been a cause of that illness. Surprisingly,
however, the defender was then held liable for the totality of the pursuer’s losses, no
reduction in damages being made to reflect the fact that it was likely that a proportion
of the overall severity of the disease had been produced by a cause (the third machine)
to which no liability attached.
The failure to make some apportionment of damages in Wardlaw has always been
troubling. If, for instance, three defenders are each responsible for contributing
quantifiable proportions of a divisible harm, it seems just that each of the three should
bear responsibility only for the proportion of the overall harm caused by it. Things are
2 1973 SC (HL) 37.
3 TheMcGhee test was recently reformulated by the House of Lords, in Barker v Corus plc [2006] UKHL
20, [2006] 2 AC 572, as liability for loss of a chance: see further M Hogg, “Re-establishing orthodoxy in
the realm of causation” (2007) 11 EdinLR 8 at 15-17.
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otherwise where the injury is indivisible, such as with death, when a court will rightly
hold each defender to have caused the whole loss, with the result that each is liable
in solidum, subject to a right to ask the court to order co-defenders to contribute
in such proportion as the court “deems just”. The assessment of so-called “conjunct
relief” on a just basis has been possible since the passage of section 3 of the Law
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940. Wardlaw was an example
of the first type of case, that is, a case of a sole defender having made a divisible
contribution to the overall totality of a pursuer’s losses. Why therefore was there no
apportionment of damages? The answer is probably that it was not asked for by the
defender, although it will be argued in the conclusion that such a request should not
be necessary. Why it was not asked for is a matter of speculation, but it may be that the
state of scientific and medical knowledge at the time precluded any sensible method
of calculating the proportionate contribution made by the machines for which the
defender was responsible.4
As has often been said, courts should do the best they can to make appropriate
apportionment in cases of divisible injury.5 But while the interests of justice may so
suggest, recent comments in the Outer House of the Court of Session tend to support
a different view.
B. WRIGHT v STODDART INTERNATIONAL
In Wright v Stoddart International plc6 a widow sued the defender for having
materially contributed to asbestosis allegedly contracted by her deceased husband.
The deceased had been exposed to asbestos while working at premises owned by the
defender’s predecessors, a company called Templetons. In addition, over the course
of his working life the deceased had also been exposed to asbestos while working for
five other employers. Some of these exposures were much greater in severity than the
Templetons’s exposure. The deceased also suffered from pleural plaques, although no
claim in respect of these was made by the pursuer and such a claim would now, in any
event, be unsuccessful given the recent decision of the House of Lords in Johnston v
NEI International.7 The Lord Ordinary, Lord Uist, held that the deceased had not
in fact contracted asbestosis but rather cryptogenic fibrosing alveolitis, a disease with
similar symptoms but of “unknown aetiology”. In view of the uncertain cause of the
disease, the defender was, quite properly, assoilzied. The decision, however, contains
a discussion of the position in the event that the deceased had, after all, contracted
asbestosis. These obiter remarks address not only the question of causation but, more
importantly for present purposes, the apportionment of damages in respect of what
was plainly a divisible injury.
4 See J Stapleton, “Lords a’leaping evidentiary gaps” (2002) 10 Torts LJ 276 at 283.
5 Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd [2000] 3 All ER 421 at 429A-B per Smith LJ; Allen v British Rail
Engineering [2001] ICR 942 at 952D-E per Schiemann LJ; Thompson v Smiths Shiprepairers (North
Shields) Ltd [1984] QB 405 at 443G-444A per Mustill J.
6 [2007] CSOH 138.
7 Johnston v NEI International Combustion Ltd [2007] UKHL 39. Following this decision, Lord Uist
issued a supplementary opinion, [2007] CSOH 173, confirming that, even had damages for such been
sought by the pursuer in Wright, such a claim could not have succeeded, given the decision in Johnston.
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On that point Lord Uist’s conclusion, contrary to the position argued for above,
was that:8
where a pursuer proves that a single defender made a material contribution to his injury or
illness, that defender is liable in full to the pursuer for causing the injury, and not just the
extent of his material contribution.
This conclusion runs counter to a number of recent English decisions, in particular
the decision of the Court of Appeal in Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd,9 in
which a claimant who had suffered asbestosis as a result of separate exposures caused
by a number of parties, but had raised an action against only one, was permitted to
recover from the sole defendant only to the extent of that defendant’s contribution
to the condition (assessed at 75%).
In view of the contrary authority, Lord Uist gave detailed consideration to the
issues, seeking support for his position by reference to five principal justifications:
1. A finding that a defender who has made only a partial contribution to a divisible
injury is nonetheless liable for the whole of the damages was supported by the
decisions of the House of Lords in Wardlaw and McGhee.10
2. In assessing damages, there is no reason to differentiate between a defender who
has materially contributed to a divisible disease (such as asbestosis) and one
who has materially contributed to an indivisible disease (such as a mesothelioma
of the pleura).11
3. The fact that a cause has materially contributed to a harmful outcome logically
entails that a defender responsible for such a cause must bear the losses of the
whole of that outcome.12
4. The decision in Holtby must be incorrect, as it suggests that there was no reason
for the introduction of the statutory provision, referred to above, regarding relief
against co-defenders in cases of joint and several liability.13
5. The defender’s request to assess damages by reference to the extent of its material
contribution was tantamount to a request to apportion liability upon parties who
had not been called as defenders.14
Despite the careful discussion of the issues, however, it is suggested that each of these
justifications is questionable.
8 [2007] CSOH 138 at para 141.
9 [2003] 3 All ER 421.
10 As well as Nicholson v Atlas Steel Foundry and Engineering Co 1957 SC (HL) 44. See [2007] CSOH
138 at para 140.
11 Para 142.
12 Para 141.
13 Para 143. The relevant statutory provision in Scotland, referred to above, is s 3 of the Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940. The parallel provision in England is s 2 of the Civil
Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (which re-enacts an earlier provision of the Law Reform (Married
Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935).
14 Para 147.
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C. CRITICAL REVIEW OFWRIGHT
First, the difficulty in relying upon Wardlaw is, as indicated earlier, that no
consideration was given to apportionment of damages. As Lord Uist points out,
this cannot have been because counsel (later Lords Avonside and McDonald) were
“remiss in their duty”.15 The fact remains, however, that we neither know why
the matter was not put to the court, nor whether any representations would have
produced a different outcome if so put. The decision is thus of little assistance as an
authority on apportionment.16 As for McGhee, again not only was the apportionment
question not put to the court, but McGhee was an entirely different kind of case
from Wright. McGhee was not about “but for” causation of a divisible injury, but
was concerned with indeterminate causation of an indivisible disease of uncertain
aetiology, and resulted in the court fashioning an equitable remedy based upon the
idea that creating or increasing a risk of injury might itself found liability. Such an
approach has little, if anything, to do with cases of asbestosis, where causation can be
shown on a “but for” basis using an entirely traditional approach.
Secondly, there is good reason to distinguish between divisible and indivisible
injuries. In the case of the latter, it is precisely because the individual effects of a
number of causes cannot be separated out that courts have had to utilise exceptional
methodology for determining liability. Otherwise a defender would be able to
exculpate itself from responsibility by saying “it cannot be shown what precisely I
have caused by way of damage, so the pursuer’s case must fail”. No such problem
exists in cases of divisible injury: as the effect of each cause can be demonstrated
– if not precisely, then at least by using some equitable method of calculation such
as length and severity of exposure in asbestosis cases – there is no need to adopt the
solution applied inMcGhee and Fairchild, and later modified in Barker v Corus plc.17
Thirdly, despite Lord Uist’s suggestion that Lord Reid said as much inWardlaw, it
does not follow, as a matter of logic, that if it can be shown that a defender materially
contributed to an outcome, he must bear all the damages for that outcome.18
Establishing causation of loss, and the subsequent decision as to what damages
a defender should bear, are quite separate matters; to conflate them disrupts
well-established principles of assessment and apportionment of damages.19
Fourthly, the decision in Holtby does not disturb the rationale for section 3 of the
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940. That section relates to
circumstances where two or more defenders are found jointly and severally liable
15 Para 141.
16 Wardlaw, it is worth adding, was a case where only one party had exposed the pursuer to the noxious
agent responsible for the injuries; in Wright, by contrast, six parties had exposed the deceased to
asbestos. The circumstances of the cases are not therefore entirely on all fours.
17 [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572.
18 A close reading of the relevant passage inWardlaw (1956 SC (HL) at 33) indicates only that Lord Reid
was asserting that a material contribution to an injury is sufficient to “establish liability”: it says nothing
on apportionment of damages.
19 In the Wright case itself, on Lord Uist’s approach, had asbestosis been proven, the pursuer would have
been entitled to full damages even although she had already received an out-of-court settlement from
another of the parties responsible for exposing the deceased to asbestos.
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in damages, and creates an entitlement to request the court to grant conjunct relief
against fellow defenders in such proportions as the court “deems just”. The section
modifies the common law right of conjunct relief, which allowed only for pro rata
apportionment. However, the circumstances of Holtby were not within the ambit of
the English equivalent of this statutory provision: as Holtby was not a case of a joint
tort, so no question of joint and several liability or of conjunct relief arose. Holtby is
authority for the position that the assessment of damages of a defendant which has,
through the commission of a discrete tort, materially contributed to an injury should
be made according to the magnitude of its contribution to the harm. Thus Holtby
should not be seen as undermining the rationale for section 3 of the 1940 Act or its
English equivalent.
Fifthly, Lord Uist mischaracterised the defender’s request. All the defender was
seeking was that the quantum of damages awarded should be assessed by reference
to the contribution which its actions had made to the deceased’s illness. There was no
question of a request that liability somehow be imposed by the back door on parties
who were not called to the action. A similar attempt to so characterise the defendant’s
argument was rejected by Stuart-Smith LJ in Holtby.20
D. CONCLUSION
Wright considers the issue tantalisingly left unconsidered in Wardlaw, namely
whether a defender who has materially contributed to a divisible injury should be
liable only to the extent of his contribution to the overall totality of the pursuer’s loss,
or whether, as Lord Uist suggests, such circumstances should give rise to liability for
the whole of the losses, such as occurs in cases of joint and several liability (of which
Wright is not an example). It has been suggested here that the former approach is
the correct one, and that an apportionment of damages according to the causal con-
tribution made by each defender should be made. Admittedly, in many cases this will
have to be a “best guess” approach, but to refuse to attempt such an apportionment21
is to saddle a sole defender with damages for losses which he did not cause.
By way of a further conclusion, it is suggested that a defender in a case of divisible
injury should not be required to ask for an apportionment of damages. After all, such
a request merely asks a court to undertake a task which it is in any event supposed
to do, namely to assess the contribution made to an injury by a defender’s behaviour
and then properly to quantify the damages which should accrue to that defender. If a
defender has caused only 25% of a pursuer’s overall losses, the defender should not be
required to ask that only 25% of the damages be attributed to it: the court should do
that in any event.22 Doubtless a wise defender will suggest the apportionment which
20 [2000] 3 All ER 421 at para 23 per Stuart-Smith LJ.
21 Lord Uist states, at para 150, that he would have declined to make an apportionment if he had
concluded that the defender had indeed causally contributed to asbestosis contracted by the deceased.
22 In Holtby, Stuart-Smith LJ had mused, at 429, that “strictly speaking the defendant does not need to
plead that others were responsible in part. But at the same time I certainly think that it is desirable and
preferable that this should be done. Certainly the matter must be raised and dealt with in evidence,
otherwise the defendant is at risk that he will be held liable for everything.”
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it thinks properly falls to it, but a failure to do so should not prevent the court from
being required to consider the matter itself.
Martin Hogg
University of Edinburgh
The author acknowledges with gratitude helpful comments of his colleague Professor
Douglas Brodie on a draft of this note.
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Interference with Natural Watercourses: Nuisance,
Negligence and Strict Liability
In Viewpoint Housing Association Ltd v The City of Edinburgh Council,1 a culvert
had been created by the defender’s predecessor to allow the Braid Burn to pass
beneath Redford Road. Unfortunately, the provision made for water flow was
inadequate and since 1984 there had been a history of flooding caused by the build-up
of debris at the culvert’s mouth. The defender was aware of this state of affairs, having
received a series of reports between 1993 and 1996, but although remedial measures
were discussed, they were not implemented until after the flood in April 2000 which
damaged the pursuer’s sheltered housing complex. The pursuer argued that this flood
would have been avoided or at least materially reduced in extent and duration had the
applicable standards been met. Accordingly, the pursuer sought damages, grounding
its action on both nuisance and negligence, but also arguing that the defender might
be strictly liable. The defender attacked the pursuer’s pleadings on relevancy.
As strict liability had not been relevantly pled, it was not the subject of debate or
a finding. Regarding the case in negligence, counsel for the defender contended that
no common law duty of care was owed by a roads authority to any party other than a
road user. However, authorities such asHanley vMagistrates of Edinburgh2 tended to
counter this contention, and in any event the defender was sued not merely as roads
authority but as the party which, by its own admission, was in ownership, occupation
and control of the culvert. Since the court could not be satisfied that either ground of
action was bound to fail, the case was allowed to go to proof before answer.
A. NEGLIGENCE AND NUISANCE
Counsel for the defender’s attack on the case grounded on negligence was,
understandably, focussed on denial of the existence of a duty of care. Since the action
grounded on nuisance was founded on the same averments of culpa, that case too was
1 [2007] CSOH 114, 2007 SLT 772. The Lord Ordinary was Lord Emslie.
2 1913 SC (HL) 27, 1913 1 SLT 420.
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contended to be irrelevant. This highlights perhaps the most important and certainly
the most unsatisfactory element of the case. This is the view taken of the relationship
between nuisance and negligence, as demonstrated by the pursuer’s reliance on the
same pleadings on culpa for both grounds. On this view the pursuer will be entitled
to succeed on the ground of nuisance if it can prove the defender’s negligence, and
the defender will evade liability if it can establish that no duty of care was owed. If
this is a correct view of the law, then the question arises: in what sense does nuisance
provide an alternative ground of claim to negligence? If the pursuer is undertaking to
prove the same thing, the grounds merely duplicate each other.
This issue was addressed by the First Division in Kennedy v Glenbelle.3 The
problem lies in the way in which Lord President Hope’s opinion in that case is being
interpreted. In Viewpoint, counsel for the pursuer noted that cases of nuisance and
negligence might run side by side. He quoted Lord Hope:4
[L]iability for nuisance [does] not arise merely ex dominio and without fault. The essential
requirement is that fault or culpa must be established. That may be done by demonstrating
negligence, in which case the ordinary principles of the law of negligence will provide an
equivalent remedy.
It is not hard to see how this passage could be taken as supporting the view that
one can establish fault in nuisance by proving negligence, and this interpretation is
accepted by the court in Viewpoint.5 However, when the (unquoted) remainder of the
dictum is examined in the context of Lord Hope’s entire opinion, it appears that this
is not the only possible interpretation and may well not be the best interpretation.
As Lord Hope was providing an analysis of culpa and delictual liability in general,
it is suggested that the passage quoted above means that liability in delict may be
established by proof of negligence, not liability in nuisance.
Lord Hope’s analysis in Kennedy begins by setting out the need to differentiate
between nuisance and negligence:6
But the analysis of authorities. . . [in RHM Bakeries v Strathclyde Regional Council]7 did
not go into the difficult question as to what types of delictual conduct on the part of the
defender, amounting to culpa or fault on his part, are actionable on the ground of nuisance
and what types are actionable by reference to the ordinary principles of negligence.
Thus, the grounding of an action on either negligence or nuisance is dependent upon
the form taken by culpa. Having stated that fault might be established in terms of
negligence, Lord Hope continued by listing other forms of culpable behaviour.8 A
party may be at fault because of malice, because of deliberately conducted acts done
in the knowledge that harm to the other party would result, because of recklessness,
or because of conduct giving rise to a special risk of abnormal damage. If Lord Hope is
3 1996 SC 95.
4 2007 SLT 772 at para 9. The quotation can be found in 1996 SC 95 at 100.
5 Para 21.
6 1996 SC 95 at 98.
7 1985 SC (HL) 17.
8 1996 SC 95 at 99.
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to be allowed to succeed in distinguishing nuisance from negligence, then the proper
interpretation of his words must surely be that fault in the form of negligence gives
rise to a claim grounded on negligence, while a claim grounded on nuisance will arise
where fault takes some form other than negligence. Such an interpretation disposes
of the muddled concept of negligent nuisance, allows clear differentiation between
the alternative grounds of action, and restores nuisance to relative coherence.9 If,
however, the view is taken thatKennedy allows recovery in nuisance where negligence
is proved, then Lord Hope has conspicuously failed to achieve what he set out to do.
The availability of nuisance as an alternative ground of action allows recovery
where culpa takes some form other than negligence. In an action grounded on
negligence it is necessary to show that a pre-existing duty of care was owed the
pursuer by the defender, and unnecessary to demonstrate that the harm amounted
to nuisance. Conversely, in an action grounded in nuisance, it is not necessary to
establish a duty of care, but it is necessary to establish that the harm complained
of amounted to nuisance, i.e. that it was plus quam tolerabile in the circumstances.
Arguments arising from factual circumstances are available in nuisance claims that
would not be available in a claim based on negligence.10 In short, there are differences
in the requirements for liability and in the available arguments, such that being
able to determine which ground is appropriate in a given situation is of some
consequence. Certainly claims for both may run together, but they should run as true
alternatives.
B. STRICT LIABILITY
Having made no such case in pleadings, counsel for the pursuer’s contention that
liability might be strict was not entertained. However, the defender appeared to
concede that there might have been a case in strict liability had one been pled.11
The basis in law for such a case may be outlined as follows. In Caledonian
Railway v Greenock Corporation12 the defender appealed a majority decision of the
Inner House which had held it liable in damages to two railway companies whose
stations were flooded as a consequence of an overflow at a culvert constructed by the
defender. In the House of Lords a dictum of Lord Justice-Clerk Hope in Kerr v Earl
of Orkney,13 which appeared to support liability without specification of fault, was
approved and the appeal was dismissed. On this basis Caledonian Railway has been
seen as authority for the view that those who interfere with natural watercourses may
be held liable without proof of fault in the event that flood damage results from their
operations.14
9 Reparation in nuisance on grounds of negligence is doctrinally incoherent: see N R Whitty, “Nuisance”,
in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) paras 17, 77, 89, 104, 105, 106.
10 Whitty (n 9) paras 43, 67.
11 2007 SLT 772 at para 5(iv).
12 [1917] AC 556.
13 (1857) 20 D 298 at 302. See [1917] AC 556 at 567 per Lord Finlay LC.
14 E.g. E M Clive, “Note on the Thirteenth Report of the Law Reform Committee for Scotland” 1964 JR
250 at 256-257.
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There are problems with this interpretation, which may result from the way in
which the decision was reported. The opinion of the Lord Ordinary (Dewar), critical
to an understanding of the case, is not reported at all, while the speeches in the House
of Lords are given in full only in Appeal Cases. The rubric in the Scottish reports15
gives prominence to the approval of Lord Hope’s dictum in Kerr, yet its relevance
to the decision in Caledonian is obscure.16 Far from being found liable without
fault, Greenock Corporation was indeed culpable. Although the pursuer argued that
fault could be inferred, it successfully proved negligence in the Outer House.17 Lord
Dewar, moreover, identified an additional aspect of fault which was affirmed in the
House of Lords. In culverting a hill burn liable to spate and in making the public
road the natural conduit for any overflow, the defender was at fault in constructing its
works in the first place.18
Caledonian Railway has been misunderstood. But while it does not vouch for
liability without fault, it serves usefully, along with other authorities, as a recognition
of a duty of care imposed on a public body constructing or in occupation and control
of works on watercourses. This, it is submitted, ought to have been its relevance to
Viewpoint. Caledonian Railway is also significant, along with other authorities, in
identifying an aspect of fault different from negligence: where harm is the inevitable
and known consequence of an action then the action itself is culpable.19
C. CONCLUSIONS
In considering the averments in Viewpoint it can be seen that more than one form
of culpa could be supported. There is initial negligence on the part of the defender’s
predecessors who constructed a culvert to a specification which breached their duty
to make sufficient provision for water flow. By allowing the continuation of a state
of affairs within its control over a period of some thirty years, heedless of advice and
regardless of known consequences for others, the defender moved beyond negligence
to recklessness. On this basis there is scope for supporting the action with separate
pleadings of culpa for each ground.
Although nuisance appears to have given rise to confusion, no change in the law
is required to provide coherence and limitations on its scope. The points raised in
this note have been discussed in legal literature.20 What does not appear to have
15 1917 SC (HL) 56, (1917) 2 SLT 67.
16 See G D L Cameron, “Strict liability and the rule in Caledonian Railway Co v Greenock Corporation”
(2000) 5 SLPQ 356.
17 Unreported opinion of the Lord Ordinary (Dewar), HL Appeal Cases 1917, vol 656 at 108A-B.
18 At 107B per Lord Dewar, approved [1917] AC 556 at 578-579 per Lord Shaw.
19 Constructive knowledge will suffice: Anderson v White 2000 SLT 37.
20 C Smith, “Scots law of nuisance: Kennedy v Glenbelle” (1995) 8 Greens Environmental Law Bulletin 4;
E Reid, “The basis of liability in nuisance” 1997 JR 162; J Thomson, “Liability in damages for nuisance”
1997 SLT 177; F McManus, “Culpa and the law of nuisance” 1997 JR 259; F McManus, “Liability for
opera manufacta in Scots law” 1998 JR 281; E Reid, “Liability for dangerous activities: a comparative
analysis” (1999) 48 ICLQ 731 at 748; Cameron (n 16); Whitty (n 9) paras 17, 77, 89, 91-93, 104-106,
108; G D L Cameron, “Making sense of nuisance in Scots law” (2005) 56 NILQ 236. See also G D L
Cameron, “Land”, in J Thomson (ed), Delict (2007) paras 14-45-14-54.
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happened is the filtering to the profession and the courts of such arguments as have
been presented. The proper interpretation of Kennedy v Glenbelle could usefully be
debated. It is also time that the strict liability myth of Caledonian Railway was laid
finally to rest.
Gordon D L Cameron
University of Dundee
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Private Law and Human Rights
How is the ECHR’s property clause (art 1 of the First Protocol) to be interpreted?
Three points must be borne in mind. The first is that the English text is incoherent.
The second is that the French text is differently incoherent.1 The third is that the
Strasburg2 court pays little attention to either anyway. No doubt that is wise. But
whether it has built a better edifice by what everyone likes to call its jurisprudence
may be doubted.
The decision of the Grand Chamber in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom3
is the end of a battle about the ownership of 50 acres of grazing land in Berkshire.
The company (Pye) lost in the High Court.4 It won in the Court of Appeal.5 It lost
in the House of Lords.6 It won (by a four to three majority) in the European Court
of Rights (Chamber).7 And now it has lost (by a ten to seven majority) in the Grand
Chamber.8 The London side of the litigation culminated in a decision that Pye had
lost ownership of the property. The Strasburg side culminated in a decision that no
compensation was payable in respect of that loss.
Planning law is all that stands between an over-crowded country and one that
would be a single city from coast to coast. Even so, rural land is sometimes
re-zoned for development, and if that happens its value rockets. Indeed, the value
rises even with themere possibility that the planning status might one day change, and
development companies often either own or have options on such land. The potential
rewards are so large that companies are prepared to take a very long-term view.
1 The Convention is authentic in English and French. The texts differ. The Human Rights Act 1998 s 1(3),
says that “The Articles are set out in Schedule 1.” But that is only half true. So what, precisely, is the text
of the Convention that has been “incorporated” into UK law? The same issue arises for the Scotland Act
1998 s 29(2)(d) read with s 126(1).
2 The traditional English-language form is, both in spelling and pronunciation, a happy medium between
Strasbourg and Strassburg.
3 J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom, 30 Aug 2007.
4 [2000] Ch 676.
5 [2001] Ch 804.
6 [2003] 1 AC 419.
7 (2006) 43 EHRR 3.
8 30 Aug 2007.
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Pye was one such company. In its land bank were 50 acres in Berkshire. Title was
registered in the Land Registry. While engaged in the long-term process of seeking
planning permission, it let the land out to local farmers, Mr and Mrs Graham. After
some years the company, fearing that this might be affecting its chances of obtaining
planning permission, terminated the tenancy. But the Grahams carried on grazing
their beasts anyway. The years came and went. After twelve had passed, the Grahams
claimed the land under the law of limitation. They had possessed it for twelve years,9
and since they had not been paying rent they had not been possessing as tenants.
In the ensuing litigation, fought to the House of Lords, the Grahams ultimately
succeeded.10 But it was clear that many of the judges did not like the result, and,
had the facts of the case not pre-dated the Human Rights Act 1998, they would have
held that the legislation was incompatible with Pye’s Convention rights. In the House
of Lords, Lord Bingham said:11
In the case of unregistered land, and in the days before registration became the norm, such
a result could no doubt be justified as avoiding protracted uncertainty where the title to land
lay. But where land is registered it is difficult to see any justification for a legal rule which
compels such an apparently unjust result, and even harder to see why the party gaining title
should not be required to pay some compensation at least to the party losing it.
A. DECISION OF THE GRAND CHAMBER
Given comments such as these, it is not surprising that Pye took their case to
Strasburg. Although the facts of the case pre-dated the Human Rights Act 1998, the
UK was of course already bound by the Convention. In this new phase of litigation,
the defendant was not the Grahams – whose title to the land could no longer be
questioned – but the UK Government. Pye sought damages equal to the value of
the land, which it estimated at £10,000,000, plus the £800,000 costs which it had
lost in its litigation with the Grahams. As already mentioned, it won by a four/three
majority. The Government sought and obtained a rehearing in the Grand Chamber,
which is hardly surprising, for two reasons. One is the close split in the Chamber
decision – and it may be added that the dissenting minority expressed themselves
fairly forcefully about the majority view. The other is that the case had a downside for
the Treasury.12 It would mean that it would be liable to pay compensation not just to
Pye but to anyone losing land by the running of time.
9 The relevant period under s 15 of the Limitation Act 1980.
10 The key issue was whether the Grahams had had sufficient possession. The High Court said yes, the
Court of Appeal said no, and the House of Lords said yes. The case is important for the English law of
adverse possession.
11 [2003] 1 AC 419 at 426. For a similar approach, see Neuberger J at first instance: [2000] Ch 676 at 710.
For the opposite view, see Mummery LJ in the Court of Appeal: [2001] Ch 804 at 822.
12 No doubt is was for this reason that the Irish Government made a third-party submission supporting
the UK position. The submission is good and, given the narrowness of the eventual decision, possibly
even had decisive effect.
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Nothing will be said here about the Chamber decision.13 In the Grand Chamber
a great and puzzling change of approach took place. According to the Chamber
decision, there had been a deprivation of property. In other words, the second
sentence of the first Article of Protocol 1 had been infringed.14 In the Grand
Chamber the majority took the view that Pye’s loss of the property was not a case
of “deprivation” but one of “control of the use of property” as governed by the third
sentence of the first article of Protocol 1.15 Since deprivation of property was precisely
what had happened, this volte-face is a strange one. It is true that the Court has
repeatedly classified deprivations as mere controls of use,16 but usually one can find
at least some basis for such an approach.17 What that basis is here would be hard to
explain. The majority says:18
The applicant companies did not lose their land because of a legislative provision which
permitted the State to transfer ownership in particular circumstances (as in the cases of
AGOSI, Air Canada,Gasus), or because of a social policy of transfer of ownership (as in the
case of James), but rather as the result of the operation of the generally applicable rules on
limitation periods for actions for recovery of land.
Whether this was intended as an explanation why there was no “deprivation” is hard to
say. At all events, the passage is hard to understand. All legislation, except for private
and local statutes, is “generally applicable”. That is as true of the legislation in the
AGOSI,19 Air Canada,20 andGasus 21 cases as it was in Pye. If one strips out the words
“generally applicable” what is left? It seems that there is no “deprivation” if either (a)
it is not the state that has taken the property or (b) the loss of property has not resulted
13 For Scottish reactions, see D Johnston, “J A Pye (Oxford) Limited v United Kingdom: deprivation of
property rights and prescription” (2006) 10 EdinLR 277; K Swinton, “Prescription, human rights and
the Land Register: Pye v UK” (2005) 73 SLG 179; K G C Reid and G L Gretton, Conveyancing 2005
(2006) 65-72; G L Gretton, “Pye: a Scottish view” (2007) 15 European Review of Private Law 281.
14 “No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.” “Nul ne peut être privé de sa
propriété que pour cause d’utilité publique et dans les conditions prévues par la loi et les principes
généraux du droit international.” The equation of “possession” with “propriété” is an issue I have
attempted to discuss in “The Protection of Property Rights” in A Boyle et al (eds), Human Rights
and Scots Law (2002) 275.
15 “The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws
as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure
the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” “Les dispositions précédentes ne sortent
pas atteinte au droit que possédent les états de mettre en vigueur les lois qu’ils jugent nécessaires pour
régementer l’usage des biens conformément à l’ intérêt général ou pour assurer le paiement des impôts
ou d’autres contributions ou des amendes.”
16 And much less commonly has classified controls of use as deprivations.
17 For example, in AGOSI v United Kingdom (1987) 9 EHRR 1, gold belonging to AGOSI was
misappropriated by someone who then sought to smuggle it out of the UK. The gold was found and
confiscated under applicable law. In an unsuccessful action against the UK by AGOSI, it was held that
this was a “control of the use of property” case.
18 Para 65.
19 AGOSI v United Kingdom (1987) 9 EHRR 1.
20 Air Canada v United Kingdom (1995) 20 EHRR 150.
21 Gasus Dosier und Fördertechnik GmbH v Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 403.
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from legislation implementing “social policy”. The first of these makes sense. But the
second? Can one distinguish social policy legislation from other legislation? Matters
become more inextricable when a few lines later the majority tells us that the law of
property itself implements “social policies.”22
The only passage that actually bears to be an explanation is the following:23
The provisions of the 1925 and 1980 Acts which were applied to the applicant companies
were part of the general land law, and were concerned to regulate, amongst other things,
limitation periods in the context of the use and ownership of land as between individuals.
The applicant companies were therefore24 affected, not by a “deprivation of possessions”
within the meaning of the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1, but rather by
a “control of use” of land within the meaning of the second paragraph of the provision.
The minority25 agrees with this approach,26 but offers no more explanation than does
the majority. Only Judges Loucaides and Kovler, in a separate dissent, say that they
“incline” to think the case one of deprivation, but they do not argue the point.
At the end of the day, it may not matter much anyway. That is because a
“control” can also be ECHR-incompatible. It is, as ever, a question of fair balance,
proportionality, the public interest, margin of appreciation and so on. For the
majority, the margin of appreciation was an important issue. “Even where title to
real property is registered, it must be open to the legislature to attach more weight
to lengthy, unchallenged possession than to the formal fact of registration.”27 “Such
arrangements fall within the State’s margin of appreciation, unless they give rise to
results which are so anomalous as to render the legislation unacceptable.”28 A relevant
consideration was also how old and well-known the legislation is:29
The fact that the rules contained in both the 1925 and the 1980 Acts had been in force for
many years before the first applicant even acquired the land is nevertheless relevant to an
assessment of the overall proportionality of the legislation. In particular, it is not open to the
applicant companies to say that they were not aware of the legislation, or that its application
to the facts of the present case came as a surprise to them.
Does this imply, as it seems to imply, that a change in the law on such matters can
affect only those who acquire after the law is changed? Does it imply, as it seems
to imply, that legislation of this sort may be ECHR-compatible for those who know




24 This use of the word “therefore” is an innovative one.
25 With the possible exception of Judges Loucaides and Kovler. Even though I do not agree with it, their
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B. IMPLICATIONS FOR SCOTLAND
What about the Scottish law about positive prescription? In one respect the Scottish
rules are more unfavourable to the paper owner than the English ones considered in
Pye. The possessory period here is shorter, being ten as opposed to twelve years.30
In another respect they are less unfavourable, for in Scotland, unlike England, the
period does not begin to run unless and until there has been a registration31 in the
possessor’s favour, a factor which helps at least to some extent to alert the paper owner,
though admittedly the significance of this is limited by the fact that the Keeper is not
allowed to let the paper owner know what is happening.32 The role of the Keeper, as
a public official, in accepting the original registration might conceivably itself be used
as a ground of challenge. Of course, if the Keeper does not know that the applicant’s
right is a bad one, his decision cannot be objected to, but if he does know, it might
be claimed that he was acting in a way calculated to undermine the paper owner’s
Convention rights. (If he does know, he will normally reject the application anyway
– but there are exceptions.33) But this argument is an upside-down one: it involves
the absurdity of saying that the Scottish system would be ECHR-incompatible
precisely because of its enhanced protection of the owner’s rights. One final argument
would be that because of the way that s 3 of the Land Registration (Scotland) Act
1979 is framed, the Keeper’s acceptance of the application will immediately divest
the true owner. But this is a point of technique rather than of substance. Normally
the registration will be reversible until prescription has run and even if it is not the
Keeper would normally compensate the ex-owner. There can be little doubt that the
Scottish system is compatible with the Convention as interpreted by the majority
in Pye.34 But given that the decision was a close one, and given that the Strasburg
court is free to depart from its own decisions, the issue of Convention-compatibility
will have to be borne in mind whenever the rules of positive prescription are revised
in future.
By positive prescription it is possible to acquire a servitude. This does not cause
a loss of ownership, but it does normally cause an uncompensated lessening in the
value of the servient land. Time can start to run without any entry on the Register.
But standing the Grand Chamber decision, Scots law is probably ECHR-compatible.
What about negative prescription, and limitation? It is true that a challenge to the
loss of a claim by the running of time was rejected in Stubbings v UK,35 but that case
30 Pye dealt with the English rules as they existed before the Land Registration Act 2002, which makes it
much more difficult to acquire a title by possession.
31 In the form of an a non domino title.
32 Land Registration Rules 2006, SSI 2006/485, r 18(2). In cases involving the foreshore, this is subject to
s 14 of the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979.
33 Registration of Title Practice Book, 2nd edn (2000) para 6.4. So if the property had been in Scotland the
Keeper would almost certainly have rejected such an application. The Land Registration (Scotland)
Act 1979 provides little guidance to the Keeper on such matters, so his practice is largely a
non-statutory one.
34 For wider discussion of the 1979 Act’s compatibility with the ECHR, see the Scottish Law
Commission’s Discussion Paper on Land Registration: Miscellaneous Issues (Scot Law Com DP
No 130, 2005; available at www.scotlawcom.gov.uk) paras 6.8 ff.
35 (1996) 23 EHRR 213.
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turned on art 6, not on Protocol 1. The loss of a personal right may be as costly as the
loss of a real right.
The minority opinion in Pye contains the curious statement that:36
In judging the proportionality of the measures it is in our view a highly material factor
that the relevant legislative provisions went further than merely precluding the registered
landowners from invoking the assistance of the courts to recover possession of their land,
by depriving them of their beneficial ownership of it.
A right of ownership that is unenforceable against a third party in possession would
be worthless, and yet the minority suggests – without actually asserting it – that if
Pye had had such a right then everything would have been fine.37 Applying the same
reasoning, perhaps the minority would likewise be prepared to accept the limitation
of actions but not extinctive prescription. It is not easy to make sense of this.
Prescription is not the only way in which private law may allow involuntary
expropriation or a severe financial loss. Most systems say that if X sells Z’s goods to Y,
Y being in good faith, then, in at least some types of case, Z is expropriated, without
compensation other than a claim against X, who may be unsuable. All systems have
rules about good faith acquisition for negotiable instruments. Can we still take the
ECHR-compatibility of such rules for granted? Again, what of the power of rescission
on the law of contract, which can be economically disastrous to one party?
The Strasburg court’s willingness to extend the ECHR into private law stands
in contrast to the attitude of the US Supreme Court. That court is second to none
in its cavalier attitude to legislative texts and in its enthusiasm for politicised decision-
making. Yet it has been very reluctant to re-write private law. Not so Strasburg. In
Pye the Grand Chamber dabbed the footbrake. But the handbrake remains off.
George L Gretton
University of Edinburgh
EdinLR Vol 12 pp 114-116
DOI: 10.3366/E1364980908000152
Short-term Benefit and the Lands Tribunal
McPherson v Mackie,1 the first decision of the Court of Session on part 9 of the
Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003, considers the extent to which the prevention of
short-term disturbance qualifies as a benefit.
In 1990 Cala Management Ltd imposed a deed of conditions on a new housing
estate, Queen’s Point, comprising eleven houses. The deed contained a number of
standard real burdens requiring inter alia that nothing should be done that may be
36 Para 14; the same idea can be found at para 7.
37 In the Chamber decision, the majority makes the same suggestion at para 55.
1 [2007] CSIH 7, 2007 SCLR 351. The opinion of the court was delivered by Lord Eassie.
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deemed a “nuisance or occasion disturbance to the adjoining proprietors”. In 2006
Mr Fraser was granted planning permission to build an adjacent development, to be
known as King’s Point. Due to the lack of access to the site, Fraser entered into an
agreement with Mr and Mrs McPherson, the owners of No 7 Queen’s Point, by which
their house would be demolished to allow the necessary access. As the demolition
would be contrary to burdens in the deed of conditions, the McPhersons applied to
the Lands Tribunal for their discharge. The Tribunal refused the application,2 and
the McPhersons and Fraser appealed to the Inner House.
A main argument for the appellants was that the Tribunal had given too much
weight to the disturbance which would be caused by construction traffic. Section
100(b)(i) of the 2003 Act requires the Tribunal to consider the “extent to which the
condition confers benefit on the benefited property”, and the Tribunal had found that
the conditions protected against “disturbance involved in the proposed development”
which included “not only the actual construction work at the subjects but also the
construction traffic using the estate road”. To the Tribunal, this seemed a tangible
benefit.
The Inner House disagreed with this approach, finding that the Tribunal’s
consideration of “the extent to which [the conditions] protect against disturbance was
flawed”.3 In coming to this conclusion the court was influenced by the recent English
Court of Appeal case of Shephard v Turner.4 The decision in Shephard turned on
an interpretation of section 84(1A)(1)(aa) of the Law of Property Act 1925, which
requires the Lands Tribunal to be satisfied that the covenant in question impedes the
reasonable user of land and “does not secure to persons entitled to the benefit of it any
practical benefits of substantial value or advantage to them”. Like the previous law in
Scotland,5 but in contrast to the 2003 Act, the English legislation requires applicants
to squeeze their application into one or more specific grounds. Scotland’s previous
law was reformed to avoid this difficulty. Under section 100 of the 2003 Act a number
of factors are to be taken into consideration and weighed against each other in the
determination of whether an application is reasonable.
This structural difference between the English and Scottish legislation
is acknowledged and then disregarded by the Inner House in McPherson.6 What is
not acknowledged is that much debate has surrounded the interpretation of the word
“substantial” under the English legislation.7 Before Shephard two cases, Re Kershaw8
and Re Tarhale Ltd,9 had expressed conflicting views. Academic commentators
proposed that, as a rule of thumb, the prevention of short-term interference is
2 2006 GWD 27-606. The full transcript is available at http://www.lands-tribunal-scotland.org.uk/title.
html.
3 2007 SCLR 351 at para 17.
4 [2006] EWCA Civ 8, [2006] 2 P & CR 28.
5 Contained in ss 1 and 2 of the Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970.
6 Para 16.
7 See the discussion by Carnwath LJ in Shephard at paras 19-25.
8 (1975) 31 P & CR 187.
9 (1990) 60 P & C R 368.
116 the edinburgh law review Vol 12 2008
not to be regarded as a substantial benefit.10 This approach influenced the court
in Shephard, where the Court of Appeal found that the prevention of short-term
disturbance by construction traffic was not a “substantial” benefit which the covenant
secured and thus could not be taken into account in the determination of the
application.11
The court in McPherson echoed the logic of Shephard by stating that the
title conditions “in the present case are directed towards continuing long-term
user – the ultimate user – rather than transitional matters such as construction
disturbance.”12 Yet it is doubtful whether this application of Shephard is entirely
appropriate. Granted both cases concern discharging burdens (or covenants) to allow
development. However, due to the different structure of the Acts, and the absence
in Scotland of any threshold requirement of the benefit of the title condition being
“substantial”, it seems that any benefit secured by a title condition should be brought
into consideration, and balanced against the other factors listed in section 100. Once
the prevention of short-term disturbance is classed as a benefit, the Tribunal can then
determine its relative weight. This weight will vary in accordance with the length and
intensity of the disturbance against which the condition seeks to protect.13
In addition, it is important to keep in mind that decisions of the Lands Tribunal
are fact-specific. In Shephard, the development in question consisted of the erection
of one single-storey house, the construction disturbance of which would last for a few
months. In McPherson the proposed development involved not only the demolition
of an existing house but the erection of sixteen new houses with related construction
disturbance which could last for up to four years. Arguably, the prevention of the
development inMcPhersonmight have qualified as a “substantial” benefit even under
the English legislation.
Upon finding that the Lands Tribunal analysis was unsound, the Inner House in
McPherson granted the appeal and remitted the application back to the Tribunal for
reconsideration. However, the case settled on 25 April 2007 – the burdens were
discharged and the development will go ahead – so that it remains to be seen how
this Inner House decision is interpreted and applied by the Tribunal. Although
Part 9 of the 2003 Act should be welcomed as simplifying the law, it is important
that it does not result in a too-easy loss of title conditions preserving amenity and
setting. Yet, as McPherson seems to put a limit on what is defined as a “benefit”, the
already high chance of success for developers seeking to discharge burdens is further
increased.14
Jill J Robbie
10 See C H S Preston and G L Newsom, Restrictive Covenants Affecting Freehold Land, 9th edn (1998)
255.
11 Para 53 per Carnwath L J.
12 Para 16.
13 This view was taken by the Lands Tribunal at first instance.
14 For previous discussion of the definition of a “benefit”, see K G C Reid and G LGretton,Conveyancing
2006 (2007) 21, where other aspects of this case are also considered.
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Fatal Accident Inquiry: Expenses against
the Crown?
Lord Advocate, Petitioner1 is a petition for judicial review of Sheriff Cowan’s decision
to grant an award of expenses against the Crown at a fatal accident inquiry.2 The case
was heard by Lord Kinclaven who, after a lengthy debate and in a judgment spanning
some 370 paragraphs, granted the petition.
A. BACKGROUND
The history attending the underlying fatal accident inquiry is unusual. William Smith,
an employee of an oil and gas drilling contractor, died in July 2001 after an accident
at work. One of his employer’s sister companies was prosecuted for alleged breaches
of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974. The case proceeded to a trial before
a sheriff and jury in January 2004. The Crown case was heard over ten days, at the
end of which a plea of no case to answer was upheld and the accused acquitted. In
April 2004, the Crown initiated a fatal accident inquiry. At a preliminary hearing, the
fiscal depute was asked why, there already having been a lengthy criminal trial, an
inquiry was sought.3 The Crown indicated it wished to canvass matters not covered at
trial. The inquiry was held over various dates in 2004. The interested parties4 became
dissatisfied with the Crown’s conduct of the inquiry and moved for expenses relative
to part of it.
The sheriff accepted the interested parties’ submission that the motion, while
unusual, was competent, stating that the sheriff court has an inherent power to
deal with expenses and that, if Parliament intends to limit that power, it must do
so expressly. The Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976
had not done so.5 Turning to the question of whether an award was appropriate in
the particular case, the sheriff questioned the Crown’s motives in holding the inquiry
and was strongly critical of the way in which proceedings had been conducted.6 The
Sheriff stated that, while the Crown’s decision to hold the inquiry did not quite
1 2007 SLT 849.
2 Fatal Accident Inquiry Into Death of William Geddes Smith 2005 SCLR 355 (henceforth Inquiry into
Death of William Smith).
3 In such circumstances the Lord Advocate will often utilise s 1(2) of the Fatal Accidents and Sudden
Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1976, which permits the Crown not to request an inquiry “where criminal
proceedings have been concluded . . . and the Lord Advocate is satisfied that the circumstances of the
death have been sufficiently established”.
4 The deceased’s employer, the sister company which had been acquitted at trial, and a colleague of the
deceased.
5 Inquiry into Death of William Smith at 359B-E.
6 These criticisms are referred to, but not set out at length, in Lord Advocate, Petitioner. They are reported
in full at Inquiry into Death of William Smith from 362C onwards.
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amount to oppression, the manner in which the inquiry had been conducted had
been oppressive and vexatious. The sheriff acknowledged that “an award of expenses
against the Crown in a fatal accident inquiry will be very rare given the necessity
for such inquiries in the public interest.”7 Nevertheless, she concluded that, in the
exceptional circumstances of the case, the public interest required an award to be
made.
B. THE PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Lord Advocate petitioned for a judicial review on the basis that the award of
expenses in a fatal accident inquiry was incompetent. In brief,8 the Crown accepted
that the sheriff court has an inherent power to award expenses,9 but contended that
the sheriff was wrong to believe that only an express provision could abrogate the
power; it could also be excluded by necessary implication. The Crown presented a
number of different lines of argument designed to establish that a proper, purposive
interpretation of the 1976 Act would lead the court to the conclusion that the sheriff’s
inherent power had indeed been excluded by necessary implication.10
The interested parties attacked the Lord Advocate’s argument on necessary
implication by contending that this committed the Crown to the impossible task of
having to establish that the making of any award of expenses in any circumstances
in any fatal accident inquiry would defeat the whole purpose of the 1976 Act.11
In addition, they argued that an expenses jurisdiction would provide an effective
means of funding interested parties’ participation in inquiries, and that the availability
of such funding, desirable as a matter of public policy, was a requirement of the
European Convention on Human Rights.
The petition was granted and the award of expenses reduced. Lord Kinclaven
stated that his reasons were “essentially those outlined by the petitioner . . . subject
to certain qualifications.”12 This, however, seems rather to understate the extent to
which the court departed from the Crown’s position. The court’s primary line of
reasoning was that, while the sheriff has an inherent power to grant expenses in
civil proceedings, the sheriff does not have such a power in relation to fatal accident
inquiries. Although the reasoning underlying this aspect of the judgment draws
upon several of the Crown’s arguments, this conclusion is a position for which the
Crown does not appear to have contended. The court’s secondary line of reasoning
proceeded on an esto basis: that, if the sheriff court does have the inherent power to
award expenses, the Crown was correct in arguing that the 1976 Act had excluded
it by necessary implication. Lord Kinclaven also considered the Crown’s position to
7 Inquiry into Death of William Smith at 364F-G.
8 The petitioner’s submissions are set out in summary at Lord Advocate, Petitioner at paras 140-193.
9 Lord Advocate, Petitioner at para 172.
10 These included submissions directed towards the overall scheme of the Act, the sui generis nature
of inquiry proceedings, and public policy considerations including the potential “chilling effect” of
allowing expenses.
11 The submissions are set out in summary in Lord Advocate, Petitioner at paras 195-227.
12 Lord Advocate, Petitioner at para 230.
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be supported by the public interest13 and rejected the interested parties’ arguments
on funding on the basis that awards of expenses were an unreliable method of
paying for participation, and that if there was an unmet need in relation to legal aid
for representation at fatal accident inquiries that deficiency was best addressed by
parliament.14
C. SOME FIRST THOUGHTS
The case raises a host of issues only some of which can be touched upon, briefly, in
this note.
(1) A remarkable omission
Leaving to one side the court’s actual decision on the point, it is remarkable that a
question as important as, “is an award of expenses competent?” should not have been
expressly addressed in the 1976 Act, particularly when other matters bearing upon the
powers of the court were.15 This case highlights a certain casualness in the preparation
of what is, on any view, an important Act of Parliament. Given the number of inquiries
held under the Act since its entry into force, it is also remarkable that the courts have
so seldom been asked to adjudicate upon this matter.16 Perhaps that is a silent tribute
to the “traditionally fair and even-handed”17 approach of the Crown, or perhaps it is
indicative of a lack of imagination, or a reluctance to “rock the boat”, on the part of
legal practitioners.18
(2) No inherent power?
Lord Kinclaven’s reasons for concluding that the sheriff court has no inherent power
to make an award of expenses in fatal accident inquiries are expressed shortly.19 He
seems to found principally upon two factors, namely, that while expenses are generally
sought and awarded in civil proceedings, they have not generally been sought and
awarded in fatal accident inquiries; and the fact that fatal accident inquiries are non-
adversarial proceedings of a sui generis nature. His conclusion may also be fortified by
the belief – expressed shortly after the passage in which he concludes that no inherent
13 Paras 349-364.
14 Paras 318-329.
15 See e.g. 1976 Act s 4(7).
16 Counsel’s researches suggest that this was only the second occasion when an award of expenses
had been sought: the first was in Inquiry Into Death of George Keggans, unreported, discussed in
Lord Advocate, Petitioner at para 162. In the Brent Spar and Cormorant Alpha inquiries, the court
was asked not to make an award of expenses in the traditional sense but to make a declaration that the
expenses of certain interested parties should be met out of public funds: see Lord Advocate, Petitioner
at para 208.
17 Inquiry into Death of William Smith at 364F.
18 In a similar vein see Sir Gerald Gordon’s commentary on Starrs v Ruxton 1999 SCCR 1052 at
1107C-D.
19 Lord Advocate, Petitioner at paras 238-246.
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power exists – that fatal accident inquiries are more similar to criminal trials than to
civil proceedings, and that, as with criminal trials, the public interest warrants that
there should be no award of expenses.20
The first of these reasons is unconvincing. As we have already seen, there are a
number of reasons why interested parties may have refrained frommoving for awards
of expenses in the past. Nor does the mere fact that a court has seldom been asked to
use a power mean that it does not exist at all: a court’s powers are not muscles which
atrophy when not exercised.
Regarding the second factor, fatal accident inquiries are modelled on ordinary
civil proceedings21 and, to that extent, it is hard to understand why Lord Kinclaven
expressed the view that they more closely resemble criminal proceedings than civil
ones. Be that as it may, fatal accident inquiries do indeed differ markedly from
regular civil proceedings, and Lord Kinclaven is justified in describing the inquiry
as a proceeding sui generis. Yet it does not follow that the sheriff court has a
different set of inherent powers associated with each form of proceedings. While
the matter is not free from doubt and would benefit from a closer analysis than
is possible here, there is much to be said for the view that the inherent power on
expenses is not tethered to a particular set of proceedings but is enjoyed by the court
qua court.22
(3) Exclusion by necessary implication
Turning now to the court’s alternative argument, we need first to acknowledge that
the sheriff oversimplified the position by stating that only an “express provision” could
oust the inherent power of the court: a statutory provision can over-ride the common
law by necessary implication as well as expressly. This, however, tells us little in itself:
the question remains, did the 1976 Act actually do so? It is suggested that it did
not, and that there was considerable force in the interested parties’ submission that
a necessary implication can only be drawn if, in its absence, the legislation becomes
unmeaning: in this context, that a fatal accident inquiry simply could not serve its
function if an award of expenses was ever competent in any circumstances. This
submission was founded upon the authority of Lord Advocate v Dumbarton District
Council,23 but an even more helpful authority is R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v
Special Commissioners of Income Tax, which provides a definition of “necessary
20 Para 259.
21 1976 Act s 4(7).
22 From the standpoint of inherent power, this may be true in the criminal context as much as the civil
one. Any discussion of the inherent power of the court cannot be confined to present practice, which is
primarily governed by statute law and a set of increasingly archaic-looking constitutional presumptions
in favour of the Crown, but by the underlying common law. This discloses that at least in courts of
inferior jurisdiction, expenses were not uncommonly awarded against the procurator fiscal in cases
of gross irregularity or oppression: see Hume, Commentaries ii, 134 f.
23 1990 SC (HL) 1.
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implication” which strikes at the very heart of the Crown’s submissions in Lord
Advocate, Petitioner:24
A necessary implication is not the same as a reasonable implication . . . A necessary
implication is one which necessarily follows from the express provisions of the statute
construed in their context. It distinguishes between what it would have been sensible or
reasonable for Parliament to have included or what Parliament would, if it had thought
about it, probably have included and what it is clear that the express language of the statute
shows that the statute must have included. A necessary implication is a matter of express
language and logic not interpretation.
It is understood that Lord Advocate, Petitioner is to be appealed. The Inner House’s
views on these matters will make for very interesting reading.
Greg Gordon
University of Aberdeen
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“Similar Facts” Evidence in Scots Law?
A. INTRODUCTION
The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 Act sections 274 and 275 protect the
complainer in sexual offence cases from being asked about previous sexual history
or character, unless it would be “contrary to the interests of justice” to exclude such
questioning. These provisions were subject to challenge inM v HM Advocate (No 2)1
but both the trial judge and the appeal court rejected the claim that they were
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.HM Advocate v DS,2
the subject of the present note, revolves around section 275A, which states that if, in
the interests of justice, the accused is allowed by the court to question the complainer
about her previous sexual history or character, his own previous conviction(s) for
sexual offences will be put to the court unless he can show in turn that this would
be “contrary to the interests of justice”.3
InDS the accused’s argument was that he should not be deterred from questioning
the complainer about her previous sexual history by the threat of having his own
previous conviction for a sexual offence put before the court. This, he alleged, was
incompatible with his right to a fair trial under article 6 of the ECHR. The Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council upheld the appeal court’s decision that section 275A
was not contrary to the accused’s article 6 rights. This is highly significant, given the
traditional antipathy of Scots law to the disclosure of an accused’s criminal record.
24 R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioners of Income Tax [2002] UKHL 21, [2003] 1 AC
563 at para 45 per Lord Hobhouse.
1 2007 JC 131.
2 [2007] UKPC D1, 2007 SC (PC) 1.
3 As inserted by the Sexual Offences (Procedure and Evidence) (Scotland) Act 2002 s 10(4).
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What is also interesting is the creative way in which the Judicial Committee
justified its decision and, ex post facto, provided a principled rationale for a
politicised and muddled piece of legislation.4 In order to deflect any implication that
section 275A was designed simply as a “deterrent threat” to discourage the accused
from questioning the complainer about her previous sexual history,5 the Judicial
Committee emphasised the relevance of the accused’s own previous conviction for a
sexual offence. In effect, it introduced, albeit within narrowly defined circumstances,
something akin to the doctrine of “similar facts evidence” which is widespread in
Commonwealth jurisdictions but which in Scotland has previously manifested itself
only within the very limited scope of the Moorov doctrine.6
B. A QUESTION OF BALANCE
In DS Lord Hope said that it was reasonably clear from the consultation document
which gave rise to section 275A,7 and from subsequent statements by the Scottish
Executive, that evidence of previous convictions was to be allowed in the interests
of “balance”.8 Lord Rodger also concluded that the purpose was to provide an
“element of parity or balance”.9 Put simply, the Judicial Committee agreed that
section 275A was designed to ensure that what is sauce for the goose should be
sauce for the gander: if the accused is allowed to bring up the complainer’s previous
sexual history, she should be given a reciprocal right. Lord Hope further explained
that the admission of previous convictions was not new.10 Section 266(4) of the 1995
Act, which originated in the Criminal Evidence Act 1898, allows the prosecutor to
question the accused, if he gives evidence, about his previous convictions (and even
previous charges) where he has attacked the character of the complainer. Section
270 allows the prosecutor to lead such evidence irrespective of whether the accused
takes the stand if the defence has attacked the character of any prosecution witness
(including the complainer). Lord Rodger added that evidence of previous convictions
had frequently been led under the common law prior to the Criminal Procedure
(Scotland) Act 1887.11 He suggested that the infrequent use of sections 266 and 270
is precisely why section 275A lays an obligation upon the prosecution to place the
4 See Scottish Parliament,Official Report, col 9928-9935 (6 March 2002). InDS Lord Rodger commented
(at para 70) of ss 274-275A: “Unfortunately, experience has indeed shown that these provisions are not
drafted with the clarity and precision which are to be expected in legislation.”
5 In the parliamentary debate Pauline McNeill MSP had suggested that this was one intention of the
Executive: see Official Report, cols 9928 (6 March 2002).
6 See P Duff, “Towards a unified theory of ‘similar facts evidence’ in Scots law: relevance, fairness and the
reinterpretation of Moorov” 2002 JR 143.
7 Scottish Executive, Consultation Document on Redressing the Balance: Cross-Examination in Rape and
Sexual Offence Trials (2000; available on http://www.scotland.gov.uk/consultations/justice/rtb-00.asp)
paras 135-138.
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accused’s convictions before the court, and also why there is the presumption that
such disclosure is in the interests of justice.12
In a revealing passage, Lord Hope noted that “the same concept, that of balance”
underlies the English doctrine of similar facts evidence, while cautioning that Scots
law has never admitted this type of evidence.13 I would argue that in effect Scots law
does admit such evidence, albeit under the restricted rubric of theMoorov doctrine.14
After reviewing the new English statutory regime contained in the Criminal Justice
Act 2003, Lord Hope concluded that section 275A is closest to the English provision
which allows evidence of “bad character” to be admitted where “it is relevant to an
important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution”.15 As Lord
Hope noted, the English legislation further defines this test by stating that the matter
at issue includes “the question whether the defendant has a propensity to commit
offences of the kind with which he is charged”,16 and this can be established by similar
previous convictions unless the court holds that this would be unjust whether because
too long has elapsed since the conviction or for any other reason. It is clear from the
above that similar facts evidence in England does not simply go to credibility but may
comprise substantive evidence against the accused.17 It is to the Judicial Committee’s
views on this matter that I now turn.
C. CREDIBILITY OR RELEVANCE?
In discussing the legislative history of section 275A, Lord Hope commented that “it
is not easy to identify . . . precisely why it was thought that the accused’s previous
conviction for a sexual offence might be relevant to the charge that had been brought
against him”.18 He noted that it had been thought “too sweeping” automatically to
place the accused’s record before the court because of the danger that the jury might
make too much of it “even if it was not really that similar”. From this he deduced
that implicit in the legislation is the view that a previous conviction might be used to
support a finding of guilt, albeit that this would be “an innovation” in Scots law. He
continued: “Although Scots law does not admit similar facts evidence, the proposition
that evidence of previous convictions has a bearing only on the accused’s credibility
seems to me . . . to understate the use that may legitimately be made of it”.19
This view was strengthened by two further facts to which Lord Hope drew
attention. First, the provision applies irrespective of whether the accused has made a
statement or gives evidence at trial; hence it cannot relate primarily to his credibility.
12 Para 69.
13 Para 33.
14 Duff (n 6).
15 Para 36. In England the common law on similar facts evidence was replaced by the Criminal Justice
Act 2003. The provisions quoted were s 101(1)(d), (g).
16 Criminal Justice Act 2003 103(1)(a).
17 There has never been any doubt about this whether under the previous common law regime or the
new statutory rules: see P Roberts and A Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (2004) ch 11.
18 HM Advocate v DS 2007 SCLR 222 at para 40.
19 Para 41.
124 the edinburgh law review Vol 12 2008
Second, since the previous convictions must relate to sexual offences and not to
offences of perjury and the like, the main intention underlying the provision cannot
have been to cast doubt on the accused’s credibility. Hence, section 275A “must
be approached on the basis that the main reason why previous relevant convictions
are to be disclosed . . . is because they may be regarded as relevant to the accused’s
propensity to commit other sexual crimes”.20
Similarly, Lord Rodger argued that one of the purposes of the rule which forbids
questioning the complainer about previous sexual history is to “counteract” the view
that such evidence almost always has a bearing on her credibility. Thus, where such
evidence is admitted under the exception in section 275A, the jury must be entitled to
take it into account when deciding whether the Crown has proved the accused’s guilt.
For instance, the fact that she had engaged in sex with the accused before might “cast
light” on whether she had consented on the instant occasion.21 If this type of evidence
is to be used in this way, by the same token the disclosure of the accused’s previous
convictions “would not be intended to have a bearing only on his credibility”.22
It is also worth noting the robust stance taken by Lord Brown. In his view, the
accused has no “fundamental right” to keep his previous record from the jury, and
there is nothing “intrinsically unfair or inappropriate” in admitting this as evidence.23
He deplored “the fiction which to my mind disfigured the administration of criminal
justice in England andWales for far too long” whereby previous convictions went only
to the accused’s credibility. He gave the example of an accused with a conviction for
rape now charged with a similar offence and contesting this on the basis of consent. In
his view, the previous conviction demonstrates the accused’s “propensity . . . to have
his way with a woman whether or not she consents” and “its real and substantial
relevance is as to the likelihood of his having committed this fresh offence”.24 In his
view, section 275A could be criticised as admitting evidence of previous convictions
only where the accused had been allowed to question the complainer about her
previous sexual history. He thought previous convictions were frequently “plainly
relevant evidence” and should be disclosed to the court in a much wider range of
circumstances.25
D. CORROBORATION?
The next point of interest relates to the Judicial Committee’s view that an accused’s
previous convictions cannot act as corroboration. In discussing Hume’s views of
evidence of bad character, Lord Hope commented:26





25 Para 105. For what it is worth, I agree with this view but do not have space to elaborate on the point
here.
26 Para 33.
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It cannot, of course, provide corroboration in support of the case which is being made by
the prosecutor. But aiding proof of the offence in other ways is another matter. The law is
open to development in that respect
He made a similar comment when discussing the directions that should be given to
jurors about relevant previous convictions.27 After quoting approvingly from a recent
English case28 – where jurors were warned that while they could take “propensity
into account when determining guilt”, they should not place “undue reliance” upon
it – Lord Hope added as if it were obvious: “A jury in Scotland would, of course, be
told that propensity to commit offences cannot provide corroboration in support of
the Crown’s case.” Similarly, Lord Rodger was equally emphatic that the accused’s
previous convictions can never “constitute corroboration of the evidence given by the
complainer” or any other prosecution witness.29
Thus, the present position is that relevant previous convictions in sexual offence
cases can support a finding of guilt but cannot act as corroboration. With all due
respect, this seems somewhat illogical.30 After all, if similar facts evidence may act
as corroboration under the Moorov doctrine, why should it not do so in this context?
To illustrate, take two cases. In case 1, A is being prosecuted for two similar offences
of indecent assault committed in 2005 and 2007. Under the Moorov doctrine, these
offences may corroborate each other. In case 2, A is being prosecuted for an indecent
assault committed in 2007; he attacks the complainer’s character and, as a result, the
prosecution reveals to the court that he was convicted of a similar indecent assault
in 2005. In this instance, according to the Privy Council, the latter incident cannot
corroborate the former. This is surely illogical – the value or weight of the supporting
evidence is equal in each case. Indeed, one can easily hypothesise a situation where
the similarities between the two offences are much greater in case 2 than in case 1,
yet in case 1 the previous incident may corroborate and in case 2, where the similar
facts evidence has more evidential value or weight, it may not.
E. PRESUMPTION THAT DISCLOSURE IS IN THE
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE
Section 275A(7) stipulates that the court is to presume that disclosure of previous
conviction is in the interests of justice “unless the contrary is shown”.31 In LordHope’s
27 Para 53.
28 Para 35. The phrases quoted come from the directions in an English case (R v Hanson [2005] 1 WLR
3169) which, Lord Hope, suggested might provide appropriate guidance.
29 Para 86. Lord Rodger also observed that the accused’s previous convictions “are not evidence that he
committed the crime with which he is charged”; rather they are “a factor which the jury would be
entitled to take into account in deciding whether to accept the evidence led in support of the Crown’s
version of events”.
30 Sir Gerald Gordon makes a similar point: “if it is relevant evidence it is difficult to see why it should
not be available as corroboration” (Commentary on HM Advocate v DS 2007 SCLR 222 at 257
para 5).
31 This falls short of the automatic disclosure which had been suggested in Scottish Executive, Redressing
the Balance (n 7) Q 15.
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view, this has to be read as being compatible with article 6 of the ECHR and,
consequently, it does no more than set out “the default position”.32 There is no
burden upon the accused to do anything other than raise the objection and thereafter
the court should simply determine the weight to be given to the opposing factors
on their own merit. In particular, “the presumption should be disregarded by the
court once it has decided what weight it should attach to the objection”. In effect, as
Sir Gerald Gordon observes, the Judicial Committee has “read” the presumption “out
of the Act altogether”.33 Lord Hope observed that the Scottish provision, unlike the
English, does not identify the factors to be taken into account in determining where
the “interests of justice” lie but, in his view, the test should be read as directed at the
accused’s right to a fair trial.34 Thus the correct balance needs to be drawn between
“the use that may properly be made of the conviction with regard to the accused’s
propensity to commit the offence” and “the risk that the jury may attach a significance
to the conviction . . . it cannot properly bear”. This bears a striking resemblance to the
now superseded English common law position as regards similar facts evidence which
was admitted if its “probative value” outweighed its “prejudicial effect”.35
Lord Hope further noted that, under current practice, the judge would not have
the information necessary to make the decision. All that is normally available is
the category of the offence (e.g. rape, indecent assault).36 In Lord Hope’s view,
section 275A does not prevent the judge from asking for details about the nature and
circumstances of the conviction if this is needed in order to rule upon the objection.
Thus, he argued, the practice should be developed whereby the judge is provided
with a copy of the charge narrating the offence of which the accused was convicted.
Again, one can see that this opens up the possibility of the type of debate that arises
in Moorov cases, or in similar facts cases throughout the Common Law world, over
whether the previous offence is sufficiently similar to the present offence, or reveals
an “underlying unity”,37 to allow it to be put as evidence by the prosecution. As Lord
Hope said, it is difficult to see how section 275A can work unless the judge has access
to detailed information about the previous offence.
F. CONCLUSION
InHM Advocate v DS the Judicial Committee has given section 275A of the 1995 Act
coherence in terms of legal principle. For this, it should be congratulated. Where
an accused in a sexual offence case is permitted to question the complainer, his
32 Para 48.
33 Commentary (n 30) at 257 para 4.
34 Para 49.
35 DPP v P [1991] 2 AC 447 at 461. It is interesting to note that these authoritative dicta emanated from
a Scottish judge, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 s 101(3) now stipulates
that similar facts evidence, which is admissible under the tests set out in s 101(1), will be excluded
“if it appears to the court that the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the
fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it”.
36 Para 51.
37 Moorov v HM Advocate 1930 JC 68 at 73 per Lord Justice-General Clyde.
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previous conviction(s) for relevant sexual offences may be placed before the court.
According to the Judicial Committee, the rationale for this is that his previous sexual
misdemeanour(s) may comprise relevant evidence against him. While this notion has
previously been largely unknown in Scotland, such “similar facts” evidence has long
been admissible across most of the Common Law world. If the accused challenges
the disclosure of his previous convictions, the trial judge will have to weigh up the
probative force of the evidence against its prejudicial effect or, in an alternative
formulation, the likelihood of it impinging upon the accused’s article 6 right to a fair
trial. The intention of the Scottish Parliament was clearly to make it difficult for the
trial judge to exclude such evidence, but the effective abolition of the presumption
in the legislation leaves the question much more open. I fear that the traditional
antipathy of Scots lawyers to the admission of previous convictions, combined with
very real concerns about breaching the ECHR’s guarantee of a fair trial, may mean
that such evidence is rarely allowed to be placed before the jury.38
Peter Duff
University of Aberdeen
The author is grateful to Sir Gerald Gordon and Greg Gordon for their comments
on this note.
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Victim Statements in Scotland
An Evaluation of the Pilot Victim Statement Schemes in Scotland1 is an interesting
and in-depth study of the use of victim statements, as piloted in the sheriff courts
of Ayr, Kilmarnock and Edinburgh, and in the High Court sitting in Kilmarnock
and Edinburgh, between 25 November 2003 and 24 November 2005. The scheme
involved an initial contact with eligible victims, by letter, giving them the opportunity
to complete a victim statement, i.e. a statement in which the victim describes the
effect of the crime on him or her. Under the scheme, if the accused was convicted,
the prosecutor was obliged to present the statement to the judge, who was in turn
obliged to take it into account in passing sentence.
As part of the evaluation, the statements were collated and analysed, and telephone
and face-to-face interviews were undertaken with a relatively small sample of victims
– both statement-makers and non-statement-makers. A number of criminal justice
and related personnel were also interviewed to provide a broader spectrum of views
38 A new study bears out these concerns: see M Burman et al, Impact of Aspects of the Law of Evidence
in Sexual Offence Trials: an Evaluation Study (2007) ch 6.
1 Scottish Executive Social Research, 2007; available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2007/
03/27152727/0. The authors were F Leverick, J Chalmers and P Duff.
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on the scheme.2 Following on from three, very broad, objectives set down in the
Scottish Executive’s Invitation to Tender document,3 the research team has produced
an evaluation which states clearly its factual and statistical findings across six main
headings: response rates; victims’ views; criminal justice professionals’ views; content
of statements; impact of the scheme on workload and court processes; and the
outcome of cases where a victim statement was made. The report also considers the
implications of these findings, both in their own terms and, more importantly, in terms
of the value of a permanent scheme covering the whole of Scotland.
Overall, this is a thorough, and eminently sensible, piece of research. It is
candid as to the practical difficulties which were encountered in relation to the
collection of data from the two remote sites – Ayrshire and Edinburgh – and, more
importantly, as to the mechanisms by which these were resolved. Sometimes this
involved analysing particular elements of the data to eliminate the possibility that
it had been skewed. For example, the pilot scheme was not administered identically
in both places. In Edinburgh, the Victim Information and Advice Service handled
the scheme’s management. In Ayrshire, where, at the time of the pilot, no such
service was available, administration was the direct responsibility of the Crown Office
and Procurator Fiscal Service. The dichotomy was not intended as two different
administration mechanisms;4 to establish whether it had any unintended effect on
its findings, the research team analysed the response rates across all three sites,
and the relative uniformity which this revealed suggested that the differences in
administration had not impacted on the data.5
Again, the information provided on the offence with which the accused was
charged was not identical. The Edinburgh site used general category headings whilst
those in Ayrshire provided specific information, thereby making direct comparisons
in this respect more or less impossible.6 This discrepancy had an impact on the final
evaluation in that, in order to make use of the data, it was necessary to reclassify
the specific information from the Ayrshire sites into the general Edinburgh category
headings.7 In terms of correlating specific offences with the likelihood of making a
victim statement, this could only be done in relation to the 2382 individuals on whom
the detailed offence information was held.8
The main point here, however, is that the research team analysed the differing data
appropriately, allowing for its lack of uniformity so that, in the end, its unevenness
made no difference to what is, clearly, the main finding of the research: that there is
a noticeably greater take-up of the opportunity to make a victim statement where the
crime charged is serious. Even the general category headings applied by the Victim
2 Evaluation para 2.1
3 Evaluation para 1.8: (1) to establish how the schemes worked in each pilot area; (2) to evaluate the
impact of victim statements on court processes; and (3) to investigate the characteristics of victims and
their statements.
4 Para 1.5 n 7.
5 Para 11.9.
6 Para 2.5.
7 Para 4.17; table 4.5.
8 Para 4.19; table 4.6.
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Information and Advice Service at the Edinburgh site allow the ranking of offences by
seriousness.9 Against an overall take-up rate of 14.9% to the offer of the opportunity
to make a statement (which the team acknowledge as low in comparison with victim
statement schemes in other jurisdictions)10 is set a 60% response rate to charges of
both murder and causing death by dangerous driving.11 This point is of significance
in relation to several of the evaluation’s findings and is noted, in various forms, in at
least ten places.12 The researchers recognise that this may colour other findings such
as that a sentence of imprisonment was slightly more likely in cases where a victim
statement was made,13 or that fewer cases were deserted where a victim statement
had been lodged.14 The statistics indicate that both of these statements are true; the
authors note the presence of the victim statement as one possible driving factor in
such decisions whilst simultaneously noting that the greater seriousness of the offence
may, in fact, be the decisive factor.15 This is an example of the thoughtful way in which
the data is analysed throughout the report. In general, the statistics are allowed to
speak for themselves but this is always done with discernment and there is no haste
to leap to premature conclusions.
One of the strengths of this piece of work is that it never loses sight of its status as
an “evaluation” rather than, simply, a report. It therefore pays close attention both
to the purpose which victim statements are intended to play within the Scottish
criminal justice system and to their impact on the rights of the accused. Most
Common Law-based legal systems provide victims with the opportunity to make a
statement concerning the crime.16 These may be either victim impact statements,
which ought simply to apprise the court of the effect which the crime has had on the
victim – whether financially, emotionally or physically – or victim opinion statements,
which allow the victim to express a view as to the appropriate outcome, usually in
relation to sentence. The latter type has caused some difficulties in the United States,
particularly in relation to capital cases,17 and it is arguable that the possibility exists of
the victimmaking a statement which, in certain respects, might be unfairly prejudicial
to the accused. Catherine Guastello, for example, suggests that impact statements
“seem to be a way for the family [of a homicide victim] to express their loss and anger
and ask for justice based on the satisfaction of their need for revenge rather than
evaluation of the specific harm caused by the defendant and his moral culpability.”18
On the other hand, the system set up in Scotland required victims to avoid expressing




12 At p 5; para 3.16; para 4.4; para 4.7; para 4.20; para 4.28; para 5.4; para 5.10; para 5.13; paras 11.3-11.4.
13 Para 5.13.
14 Para 5.7.
15 Paras 5.8, 5.13.
16 J Chalmers, P Duff and F Leverick, “The pilot victim statement scheme in Scotland” 2007 SLT (News)
103 at 103.
17 See C Guastello, “Victim impact statements: institutionalized revenge” (2005) 37 Arizona State Law
Journal 1321.
18 At 1331.
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any view on the appropriate outcome.19 It is encouraging for the involvement of lay
people in the criminal process that the majority of statement-makers (72%) followed,
and complied with, the written instructions and restricted their accounts to the effect
of the offence.20
Equally, in both Scotland, and England and Wales, there has been much political
rhetoric on the issue of “balance” between victim and offender. Though many
academic commentators are, rightly, critical of the idea that it is somehow possible
to create a zero sum by adding rights to the victim’s side of the equation to balance
the due process rights which the accused has always enjoyed,21 it is fair to say that,
previously, the victim’s only role was as a prosecution witness and that the only
information disseminated to him or her concerning the case was that which related
directly to giving this evidence. It is interesting that a major concern of some of the
sheriffs who were interviewed as part of this research was that victim statements
might be actively unfair to the accused, allowing victims to introduce prejudicial
elements into the case which would not otherwise be relevant.22 This was an issue
in the case of HM Advocate v JM in 2004, and the authors have included Sheriff
Stoddart’s judgment on this point as an annex.23 It is apparent from this and, indeed,
from the comments of the criminal justice professionals who were interviewed, that
sheriffs regard themselves as having the skills to exclude from the decision-making
process comments by victims which are unfairly prejudicial, whether as to conviction
or sentence, and that they make judgments of this nature on a regular basis, albeit not
previously in relation to victim statements.24 In covering this point, the authors have
ensured that they address an important concern of commentators on the criminal
justice system.25
Taken together, this leads to the view, which is expressed slightly more strongly
by the authors of the evaluation in a subsequent article,26 that victim statements
might provide a mechanism for enhancing victim participation and satisfaction with
the criminal process without unduly detracting from fairness to the accused. The
evaluation emphasises the point that, following the conclusion of their cases, a
majority of statement-makers (86%) took the view that making a statement was
“definitely” or “probably” the correct decision.27 There may be a variety of reasons
19 Section 14(2) of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (the primary legislation setting up the
scheme) specifies that the statement must be “as to the way in which, and degree to which, th[e]
offence . . . has affected and . . . continues to affect, [the victim]”. In addition, the instructions on the
statement form itself stated that views about the accused person or the appropriate sentence should
not be included.
20 Para 8.5.
21 See, e.g., I Edwards, “An ambiguous participant: the crime victim and criminal justice decision-making”
(2004) 44 Brit J Criminol 967.
22 Paras 7.20, 7.21, 7.30-7.41.
23 Annex 10.
24 Para 7.38.
25 See e.g. A Ashworth “Victim impact statements and sentencing” [1993] Crim LR 498 at 507.
26 See J Chalmers, P Duff and F Leverick “Victim impact statements: can work, do work (for those who
bother to make them)” [2007] Crim LR 360.
27 Para 6.41; table 6.16.
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for this but, given that only 53% of those who declined the opportunity to make
a statement were similarly content with their decision at the same point in the
process,28 it seems fair to say that victims, those whom the scheme was designed
to benefit, had gained from being offered the chance. Even a majority of respondents
who described making the statement as upsetting (20/34) found that, overall, going
through that process made them feel better.29 Again, the evidence from the evaluation
indicates that victims want primarily to be kept informed rather than to influence the
outcome of the case.30 Accordingly, if victim statements only cause a small ripple in
the waters of fairness to the accused, rather than the expected tidal wave, and if,
at the same time, they increase, even minimally, victim satisfaction with the criminal
process, there are clear benefits in rolling the scheme out nationwide. The evaluation’s
authors are to be commended for a balanced piece of research on which such a
conclusion could be based. The Scottish Government is still considering their findings
and has not yet determined whether the scheme should be extended or not.31
Claire McDiarmid
University of Strathclyde
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Classification of Delictual Damages – Harding v
Wealands and the Rome II Regulation
In Scottish – or English or Northern Irish – private international law, damages have
traditionally been regarded as a mixture of substance and of procedure.1 Although
it is difficult to draw a dividing line, it has generally been agreed that the heads of
damage are an issue of substance and should be governed by the lex causae, while the
quantification of damages is an issue of procedure and should be decided according
to the lex fori.2 However, the division between substance and procedure is not clear-
cut. Whether ceilings on damage awards are covered under the “heads of damage” or
the “quantification of damages” is particularly controversial. These issues have been
examined in a number of recent English cases.3 The latest decision, by the House
of Lords in Harding v Wealands,4 might have been expected to be the last word.




1 McElroy v McAllister 1949 SC 110 at 133 per Lord Keith; Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356 at 379 per
Lord Hodson.
2 Dicey, Morris and Collins: Conflict of Laws, 14th edn, by L Collins et al (2006) paras 7-035, 35-053.
3 Edmunds v Simmonds [2001] 1 WLR 1003; Roerig v Valiant Trawlers Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2304; Hulse v
Chambers [2001] 1 WLR 2386.
4 [2006] UKHL 32, [2007] 2 AC 1.
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However, despite the high status and careful exposition of a unanimous decision, its
importance is greatly limited by new European legislation. Contrary to the existing
Scottish (English) rules, the Rome II Regulation provides that the assessment of
damages or remedy claimed is governed by the lex causae.5
A. HARDING v WEALANDS
(1) The facts
In Harding v Wealands, the claimant, Mr Harding, an Englishman, was rendered
tetraplegic following an accident in New South Wales caused by the defendant,
Ms Wealands, an Australian national. Mr Harding brought an action in England
and Ms Wealands conceded liability. Under the law of New South Wales, the
Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 imposes a restriction on the damages
for injuries suffered in motor accidents. There is no such restriction in English
law. It was unanimously agreed in the Court of Appeal,6 and not questioned in
the House of Lords, that the applicable law on the substance was the law of
New SouthWales. In the Court of Appeal the question came down to the classification
of assessment of delictual damages. If this was classified as a question of substance,
the law of New South Wales law applied, to the advantage of the defendant; if it was
classified as procedure, English law applied, to the advantage of the claimant. A
majority of the Court of Appeal decided that assessment of damages was an issue
of substance. The House of Lords unanimously held that assessment of damages is
procedural, that a cap on damages is an issue of assessment of damages, and therefore
that English law applies to that issue as the lex fori.
(2) The issues
In delivering the leading speech, Lord Hoffmann considered the old choice of
law cases, and concluded that the traditional rule regarded matters of remedy as
procedure which is governed by the lex fori.7 This common law approach had not
been affected by part III of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act 1995.8 Lord Hoffmann then concluded that statutory ceilings on damages
are matters of procedure rather than substance.9 Although a report by the Law
Commissions on Choice of Law in Tort and Delict had stated that “a statutory ceiling
on damages is a substantive issue for the applicable law in tort or delict rather than a
5 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to
non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ 2007 L199/40, art 15(c).
6 [2005] 1 All ER 415.
7 [2007] 2 AC 1 at para 24.
8 Paras 31-38. See the similar reasoning of Lord Rodger at paras 62-69. Only Lord Carswell, at paras
79-83, felt it necessary to rely on a statement to this effect in the House of Lords during the passage of
the Act by Lord Mackay of Clashfern, then Lord Chancellor.
9 Paras 39-53. On the question of whether a cap on damages is a matter of procedure Lord Woolf
(para 10) conceded that the answer was not “obvious”, while Lord Hoffmann (para 51) hinted that it
might not be the best result but that his job was to preserve the common law rule that “Parliament
intended to preserve” by the 1995 Act.
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procedural issue for the lex fori”,10 Lord Hoffmann saw this as inconsistent with the
view in the same report that no changes should be brought to the common law rules
on the question of damages.11 Since the common law classifies all matters relating to
remedies as procedure, this basic principle should apply.
The House of Lords’ reasoning is controversial. The substance-procedure line in
the common law is ambiguous and unclear. As Lord Pearson said in Boys v Chaplin,
“I do not think there is any exact and authoritative definition of the boundary between
substantive law and procedural (or adjectival or non-substantive) law”.12 There is no
doubt that in the 1995 Act Parliament intended assessment of damages to continue to
be classified as procedure. However, there is nothing in Lord Mackay’s statement, or
elsewhere in the travaux preparatoires, to indicate that caps on damages fell within
assessment of damages. Hence the Law Commissions’ statement – following on from
Dicey’s view that “statutory provisions limiting a defendant’s liability are prima facie
substantive; but the true construction of the statute may negative this view”13 – creates
a strong case for believing that Parliament would have thought that caps on damages
were classified as substance.
(3) The effects
In adopting a wide definition of procedure, the House of Lords employed a strict
reading both of the legislative text and of the pre-1995 common law. Even if Harding
is correct in law, the appropriateness of this broad classification of procedure seems
questionable as a matter of policy.
First of all, it may not be fair to apply different laws to the existence of liability
and to the remedy. If a cause of action is unknown in Scotland but exists in the
lex causae, it is hard to use Scots law to assess damages.14 In other cases, the lex
causae may adopt strict liability but at the same time introduces a limitation to the
remedy in order to provide a reasonable balance,15 while in the lex fori liability may
be based on negligence or even fault, with higher damages being awarded to reflect
the higher level of wrongdoing. It is unfair for the defender to be subject both to the
strict liability of the lex causae and to the higher damages of the lex fori.
Secondly, it may be argued that the rule fails to observe the function of the
applicable law and the lex fori.16 The main rationale for classifying an issue as
10 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Report on Private International Law: Choice of Law
in Tort and Delict (Law Com No 193, Scot Law Com No 129, 1990) para 3.39. See also Dicey and
Morris: Conflict of Laws, 13th edn, by L Collins et al (2000) para 35-055.
11 Report on Private International Law para 3.38.
12 [1971] AC 356 at 395.
13 This first appeared in the 7th edition of Dicey’s Conflict of Laws (ed J H C Morris, 1958) 1092,
and was still in the editions which were current at the time of the Law Commissions’ Report
(11th edn, by L Collins et al (1987) 188) and of the 1995 Act (12th edn, by L Collins et al (1993) 184).
Lord Hoffmann does a careful job of analysing the cases on which the proposition in Dicey was based
and concludes (paras 42-48) that it “was too widely stated” and had no application to tort rather than
contract damages.
14 Dicey, Morris & Collins (n 2) para 35-056.
15 C Dougherty and L Wyles, “Harding v Wealands” (2007) 56 ICLQ 443 at 452.
16 P Rogerson, “Quantification of damages – substance or procedure?” (2006) 65 CLJ 515 at 516-517.
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procedure, thus bringing in the lex fori, is convenience.17 However, there is no reason
why applying the foreign law to assess damages should cause more inconvenience
than applying the foreign law to decide whether a tort is actionable in the first
place.18
Thirdly, it is doubtful whether this classification is up-to-date or whether it is
compatible with the current practice in the world19 or in other areas of Scots law. The
Rome Convention, which has been implemented by the Contracts (Applicable Law)
Act 1990, provides that the assessment of damages, insofar as governed by rules of law,
is governed by the lex causae.20 This ambiguous provision separates the assessment
of damages into two categories, namely the rules of law and the questions of fact. The
first category, which surely covers statutory restrictions on damages, is classified as
substance and governed by the lex causae.21
Fourthly, the inclusion of statutory restrictions on damages as procedure makes the
scope of procedure unreasonably wide. The classification can be seen as a parochial
device to limit the effects of the lex causae by extending the application of the
lex fori,22 when, as Anton notes, “the constant aim of the Scottish courts should
be to restrict” the domain of procedure. “To classify a foreign rule as procedural is to
except it from its normal application in Scotland and, on general principles, exceptions
are to be strictly interpreted.”23
Fifthly, the current approach may open the door for forum shopping, especially
when discretion to decline jurisdiction has been largely barred by the European
jurisdiction system.24
B. ROME II REGULATION
About twelve months after the decision in Harding v Wealands, the Rome II
Regulation was adopted by the Council of the European Union and approved by the
17 See Anton’s test of applying the foreign rules unless it is “impracticable” to do so within the terms
of Scottish procedures: see Private International Law, 1st edn (1967) 542. See also Roerig v Valiant
Trawlers Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2304 at para 26 per Waller LJ; J Carruthers, “Substance and procedure in
the conflict of laws: a continuing debate in relation to damages” (2004) 53 ICLQ 691 at 692;
C M V Clarkson and J Hill, The Conflict of Laws, 3rd edn (2006) 470.
18 Lord Woolf points out in Harding (para 11) that the New South Wales Act has “provisions which it
would be very difficult, if not impossible, to apply in proceedings brought in this country”.
19 See the shifts away from the traditional English approach on treating assessment of damages as pro-
cedural in Canada and Australia, acknowledged by Lord Rodger in Harding (para 69) as “ammunition,
or food for thought, for critics of the policy adopted by Parliament in the 1995 Act”.
20 Art 10(1)(c).
21 M Giuliano and P Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations,
OJ 1980 C282, 33;Dicey, Morris & Collins (n 2) para 32-301;Cheshire and North: Private International
Law, 13th edn, by P M North and J J Fawcett (1999) 88; Clarkson & Hill, Conflict of Laws (n 17) 469-
470; Dougherty & Wyles (n 15) at 451.
22 G Panagopoulos, “Substance and procedure in private international law” (2005) 1 Journal of Private
International Law 69 at 71.
23 A E Anton, Private International Law, 1st edn (1967) 542, in stark contrast to the tendency in England
to give a broad construction to procedure: see Panagopoulos (n 22) at 71.
24 See Panagopoulos (n 22) at 71; Harding v Wealands [2007] 2 AC 1 at para 64 per Lord Rodger; Case
C-128/01 Owusu v Jackson [2005] ECR I-1383.
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European Parliament.25 It will apply from 11 January 2009, replacing the national
choice of law rules in non-contractual obligations which fall within its scope. Like the
traditional Scottish (and English) rules, the Rome II Regulation divides substance
and procedure, and leaves the issue of procedure to the law of the forum.26 However,
it further provides that “the existence, the nature and the assessment of damages or
remedy claimed” should be governed by the lex causae.27 No guidance is provided as
to what constitutes “the assessment of damages or remedy claimed”, but the words
used are wide enough to cover all matters relating to damages, including what have
been traditionally classified as procedural issues in Scotland. Under the Rome II
Regulation the issue of damages is no longer a mixture of substance and procedure,
but a unitary package, which is classified as “substance” and governed by the
lex causae. As a result, the importance of Harding v Wealands has been greatly
limited.
(1) Observations on the Rome II classification
The Rome II Regulation overturns the highly controversial rules in the UK.
By classifying all matters relating to damages as substantive, it adopts a narrow
definition of “procedure”, which is compatible with the practice in most of continental
Europe. As already mentioned, it is not the best solution to classify assessment of
damages as procedure. In addition, there are both theoretical and pragmatic reasons
to classify remedies as substance. First of all, the remedy is an inseparable part of the
right.28 The restriction of assessment of damages can be regarded as a restriction of
the right itself.
Secondly, applying the lex causae to both the heads and the assessment of damages
is more desirable for the purposes of private international law. The function of choice
of law is to select a law that is “most appropriate” to decide a dispute. The lex causae
should have a wide scope of application and only in exceptional circumstances should
its effect be declined. While the lex fori is often an “appropriate” system of law to
govern a dispute, this is not always the case because exorbitant rules of jurisdiction still
exist and because an acceptable basis of jurisdiction, such as the defender’s domicile,
is not usually as appropriate a law to govern a delictual dispute as the law of the place
of damage (the main rule in article 4 of Rome II).
Thirdly, the unitary solution provided by the Rome II Regulation avoids the vexed
issue of how to draw a line between substance and procedure within damages. In
most cases the lines between the heads of damage, the remoteness of damage, and
the assessment of damage are vague. There are a number of borderline issues in




28 Panagopoulos (n 22) at 77.
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(2) Some problems
Although the Rome II Regulation brings simplicity and clarity into a traditionally
vexed area, certain new problems are also created. One of the reasons that the UK
Parliament classified the assessment of damages as procedure and applied the lex fori
was to avoid excessive awards of damages. In the debate on the 1995 Act, the Lord
Chancellor, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, warned against bringing “American scales of
compensation into English courts”.29 The lex causae may award punitive damages or
even just levels of damages classified as compensatory but at excessively high levels
by Scottish standards. By classifying assessment of damages as a matter of substance,
the Rome II Regulation creates the possibility that Scottish courts will have to make
extremely high damages awards when applying certain foreign laws. The difference
between two legal systems on the assessment of damages will not be considered
excessive or unendurable in most cases. However, when this difference is so extreme
that it would be contrary to the fundamental policy or public interest of the forum,
the forum should be able to find a way to reduce the level of damages awarded to a
level consistent with its public policy.
The public policy exception in the Rome II Regulation has to be read in the light
of recital 32. It provides that:
the application of a provision of the law designated by this Regulation which would have the
effect of causing non-compensatory exemplary or punitive damages of an excessive nature
to be awarded may, depending on the circumstances of the case and the legal order of
the Member State of the court seised, be regarded as being contrary to the public policy
(ordre public) of the forum.
This recital is drafted in a way that seeks to avoid the European Court of Justice giving
a uniform interpretation of when excessive damages are contrary to public policy by
saying that the issue is not only case-specific but also varies depending on the “legal
order of the Member State of the court seised”. Part of the sensitivity here is that
several legal systems in the EU award exemplary or punitive damages in certain cases.
Thus it was unacceptable to categorise all exemplary or punitive damages as contrary
to public policy but only “excessive” damages in those categories. A telling omission
from the recital is the idea that public policy could be used to reduce damages awards
that are compensatory under the lex causae but excessively beyond the amount that
the lex fori would regard as necessary to compensate the victim. This might lead
courts to classify the part of a damages award they believe to be excessive as exemplary
or punitive even though it would be classified as compensatory by the lex causae. This
is an unfortunate temptation to keep playing the classification game.
Another problem with applying the lex causae to assessment of damages is that the
awards might be much lower than under the lex fori. This might result in those living
in the forum receiving inadequate compensation because the higher costs in that
jurisdiction are not anticipated by the applicable law.30 The European Parliament,
29 Quoted in Harding v Wealands [2007] 2 AC 1 at para 37.
30 Lord Rodger highlights this problem in Harding v Wealands [2007] 2 AC 1 at para 70.
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concerned about this problem in the context of traffic accidents, introduced recital
33 providing as follows:
According to the current national rules on compensation awarded to victims of road traffic
accidents, when quantifying damages for personal injury in cases in which the accident
takes place in a State other than that of the habitual residence of the victim, the court
seised should take into account all the relevant actual circumstances of the specific victim,
including in particular the actual losses and costs of after-care and medical attention.31
The problem with this recital is that it does not link to any substantive provision
of the Regulation. It attempts to say what national substantive law should do, whereas
the Regulation only helps to determine which law applies to the dispute and not what
the content of that law should be.
(3) Some exceptions
The Rome II Regulation provides a different classification for the assessment of
damages than the prior Scots law. However, some non-contractual obligations,
notably defamation and other privacy-related delicts, are excluded,32 and theHarding
classification will continue to apply. This means that, while the assessment of damages
will be classified as substance and governed by the applicable law in most delictual
cases, such as traffic accidents, product liability, and environmental damages, in
cases such as defamation the assessment of damages will continue to be classified as
procedure. It is doubtful whether such mixed and inconsistent rules are appropriate
in the future, and the UK legislatures should think carefully about the best solution in
areas outside the scope of Rome II when repealing part III of the 1995 Act. However,
the political lobby that ensured defamation was outwith the scope of Rome II is likely
to prevent the extension of the Rome II rules by UK legislation.
Paul Beaumont and Zheng Tang
University of Aberdeen
EdinLR Vol 12 pp 137-144
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The Scottish Parliament Elections 2007 – what kind
of hackery is this?∗
To put electoral law at the front and centre of popular discourse is no mean
feat, and rarely bodes well. Before polls closed across Scotland on 3 May 2007,
31 The Commission made a Statement at OJ 2007 L199/49 that it will make a study, to be submitted to
the European Parliament and Council before the end of 2008, on “the specific problems resulting for
EU residents involved in road traffic accidents in a Member State other than the Member State of their
habitual residence”. This study will take account of the variation in levels of compensation awarded to
victims of road traffic accidents in different Member States and will pave the way for a Green Paper.
32 By art 1(2).
∗ Thanks and apologies to Amy Winehouse for the subtitle.
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problems with postal voting surfaced, to be followed by concerns regarding the
novel system of electronic ballot counting. With the first results in, it became clear
that the quantum of spoilt ballot papers was a matter of deep concern, if not
outrage. Quickly initiated were processes of reflection, recrimination and much else
besides. Initial allocations of blame were tentative but questions were inevitably
asked of the Electoral Commission (the public body principally charged with voter
education/information, and with a significant advisory role in the administration of
elections), the Scotland Office (responsible for electoral law and policy pertaining to
Holyrood), its then Secretary of State (Mr Douglas Alexander MP), and the Scottish
Executive (responsible for most aspects of electoral law and policy pertaining to
Scotland’s 32 local councils). Suspicions of venality were not far from the surface of
some criticisms.
On 4 May the Electoral Commission announced that it would expand its
statutory duty to report on the administration of Scottish Parliament elections1
to include an independent review of the “the high number of rejected ballots;
the electronic counting process; and the arrangements for postal voting”. A senior
Canadian electoral administrator, Mr Ron Gould, was appointed to head the review.
Before delivering its final report on 23 October 2007,2 the independent review
took submissions from various individuals and organisations,3 engaged in a public
consultation exercise,4 assessed images of rejected ballot papers,5 and evaluated the
Electoral Commission’s public awareness campaign.6
Commencing with an outline of the legal context of the Holyrood elections,
this note outlines and scrutinises the principal findings of the independent review.
Comprehensive and determinedly even-handed, the report contains a number of
prescriptions worthy of attention, not merely for the improvements to the electoral
system that they may yield, but also for the looseness of certain of our constitutional
arrangements that they reveal.
A. LEGAL CONTEXT
The law pertaining to Scottish Parliament elections is, of course, specifically reserved
to Westminster, in schedule 5 of the Scotland Act 1998. In and of itself, this is
not a matter of great relevance for the smooth running of such elections – the
contests of 1999 and 2003 were run without major incident. As has been noted, in
matters relating to the franchise, electoral system, electoral administration and party
1 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 s 5.
2 Independent Review of the Scottish Parliamentary and Local Government Elections 3 May 2007
(The Electoral Commission, 2007), available at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/templates/
search/ document.cfm/20316 (henceforth the Gould Report). The terms of reference of the review are
to be found at appendix E.
3 Gould Report, appendix A.
4 Appendix B.
5 Appendix D. For reasons of voter anonymity, only images of ballot papers, not the ballot papers
themselves, were viewed by the review: Gould Report 8.
6 Appendix C.
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finance, “[t]he Scottish Parliament must wait upon Westminster to act.”7 Fortunately,
Westminster has indeed acted. Electoral law has been something of a growth area
since 1997 with each of the above-mentioned areas being regulated by recent Acts
of Parliament,8 and with detailed rules to accommodate the Scottish approach to
electoral administration and conduct being generated through Westminster statutory
instruments.9
By contrast, the law pertaining to Scottish local government elections is a devolved
matter (except for the franchise), governed principally by the Local Governance
(Scotland) Act 2004, which introduced the single transferable vote system. A major
innovation brought about by Liberal Democratic presence in the 2003-7 Scottish
Executive coalition, the new voting system led in turn to the introduction of electronic
counting for use in both Holyrood and local government elections.
A further addition to the electoral landscape since the 2003 election has been
the Arbuthnott Report,10 which arose from the Boundary Commission for Scotland’s
2004 review recommending a reduction in Scottish Westminster constituencies from
72 to 59.11 Charged with considering the issues arising from non-coterminous
boundaries as between Westminster and Holyrood constituencies, and the four
different voting systems in Scottish elections,12 the Commission reported in January
2006. For present purposes, the key recommendation was that the Scottish
Parliament ballot papers should be redesigned to reflect better the way the additional
members system of voting works.13
The Report received a somewhat tepid welcome from the then Secretary of
State, Mr Alistair Darling MP, who noted that, “should I decide to take forward any
legislative changes these could not be made before the Holyrood election in 2007.”14
Given that an election was less than 18 months away, this cautious approach was
certainly defensible – single transferable voting was on the way in and the necessary
reforms of the Electoral Administration Act 200615 were already well in train.
7 H Lardy, “Devolution and democracy”, in A McHarg and T Mullen (eds), Public Law in Scotland
(2006) 89 at 95.
8 Representation of the People Acts 1983, 1985 and 2000; Scotland Act 1998; Political Parties, Elections
and Referendums Act 2000; Electoral Administration Act 2006.
9 E.g., the Representation of the People Regulations (Scotland) 2001, SI 2001/497.
10 Commission on Boundary Differences and Voting Systems, Putting Citizens First: Voting, Boundaries
and Representation in Scotland (2006) (henceforth the Arbuthnott Report).
11 The reduction was effected by the Scottish Parliament (Constituencies) Act 2004.
12 Namely, the d’Hondt method of proportional representation for the European Parliament, plurality (or
first past the post) for the House of Commons, additional members system for the Scottish Parliament,
single transferable vote for local government.
13 Arbuthnott Report (n 10) 73, recommendation 7; para 4.52. The report made a large number of other
recommendations, relating inter alia to voter information, “open” regional lists, and greater use of new
technologies.
14 Press Release, Arbuthnott Commission Reports to Darling, Scotland Office, 19 January 2006. Emphasis
added.
15 A response to the problems with postal voting at the 2005 general election, and the secret loans
to political parties, the Act also made numerous amendments to the electoral administration and
registration process. Further legislation, the Local Electoral Administration and Registration Services
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However, with Mr Darling’s departure from Dover House in May 2006 went the
circumspection. The new incumbent, Mr Douglas Alexander, brought with him a
change in approach. Indicating a desire to take forward the redesign of the ballot
paper by introducing a single sheet – in the two previous Scottish Parliament
elections, electors were provided with separate papers for constituency and regional
list races16 – the Scotland Office requested the Electoral Commission to undertake
public opinion research in order to assess the impact of any possible change in format.
The research was both small-scale and inconclusive (as well as returning a rejection
rate of 4%),17 and on 16 August 2006, the Electoral Commission highlighted the need
for further consideration on the matter of a combined ballot sheet.18 In a departure
from the Arbuthnott Report’s suggestion that the Electoral Commission take the lead
on the issue of ballot redesign, the Commission’s participation in the process ended
here and the project was moved forward on an inter-party consultative basis. With the
major parties in agreement,19 Mr Alexander announced the combined ballot paper
on 22 November 2006.20 The Scottish Parliament (Elections etc) Rules 2007 were
debated in Westminster in February 2007 although, contrary to past practice, the
resultant Order did not include a prescribed form of the combined ballot sheet.21
It is unclear why this particular recommendation of Arbuthnott was singled out for
legislative attention, nor why the “no new legislation” policy of the previous Secretary
of State was reversed, nor indeed why a single sheet ballot paper was thought the best
way to clarify the equal status of regional list MSPs.
A possible consequence of a single sheet ballot paper is the minimisation of
“leakage”. This is the process in an additional members system election whereby
electors vote for one party in the constituency race, but select another for the
regional list, thereby “leaking” support away from their “home” party. Larger parties
suffer most from leakage, being much more likely to contest both constituencies
and regions. The hypothesis is that the propensity for leakage is diminished with
a combined ballot paper, as electors find it cognitively difficult to mark support
for different parties on a single sheet. Gould, however, finds no evidence that the
inter-party discussions were motivated by such considerations.
As to the consultation process, Gould remarks that “it . . . seems that it had been
the intention of the Scotland Office to proceed with using one combined ballot
sheet since nearly the beginning of the planning stage.”22 Moreover, the absence
(Scotland) Act 2006, was required to replicate the provisions for the Scottish local government
elections.
16 Press Release, E-Counting to be Used in 2007 Elections, Scotland Office, 9 June 2006 (“I want a single
ballot paper [to remove] any confusion that a vote on the regional list is less important, or a second
choice”).
17 Gould Report (n 2) 39.
18 Gould Report 39 n 10.
19 The Labour, Liberal Democratic and Scottish Nationalist Parties all approved the single ballot sheet.
The position of the Conservatives is elusive.
20 Press Release, Douglas Alexander Announces 1 Page Ballot Paper for May Elections, Scotland Office,
22 November 2006.
21 The Scottish Parliament (Elections etc) Order 2007, SI 2007/937.
22 Gould Report 40.
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of a prescribed form for the combined ballot sheet23 meant that the Scotland
Office worked alone with the commercial company producing the ballot papers
“without adequately communicating its decisions on the combined ballot paper to
returning officers, who are legally responsible for ensuring that ballot papers are
legally compliant.”24 Indeed, it was not until 17 April 2007 – six days after the close
of nominations, and a mere three weeks before polling day – that the Scotland Office
provided returning officers with a written explanation of the changes to the ballot
paper. This is but one instance of the damagingly compressed timetable for the
administration of the election.
B. THE MESS
Before considering whether any of the above contributed to the debacle that was the
Scottish Parliament election of 2007, it is worth briefly revisiting the episode.
Table 1. Rejected Ballots in Scottish Parliament Election 1999-2007
1999 2003 2007
Constituency races
Number 9,210 12,810 85,644
% of all ballots 0.39 0.66 4.08
Regional races
Number 7,268 12,482 60,455
% of all ballots 0.31 0.67 2.88
These simple figures capture the qualitative difference in the rate of rejected, or
spoiled, ballots as between 2007 and previous Scottish Parliament elections, with
rejection rates approximately five times higher than in the past. The total number
of ballots cast that did not count is approximately equal to the electorate of the City
of Dundee. Further, analyses show considerable variations within these figures across
Scotland (see table 2, overleaf).
In seeking to explain such wide variations, some analyses have focused on socio-
economic factors.25 Whilst one might hypothesise that electors in areas of multiple
deprivation are more likely to spoil their ballot papers inadvertently, other factors
may be at play. Election expenditure returns to the Electoral Commission show that
the Labour incumbent in Glasgow Shettleston expended only one third of his limit,
indicating a modest campaign. In neighbouring Glasgow Govan – a constituency with
its own social challenges – the hard-fought contest was a gain for the SNP’s Ms Nicola
23 In accordance with article 89 of the Scottish Parliament (Elections etc) Order 2007, the Scotland Office
could change the style “with such variations as the circumstances may require.”
24 Gould Report 40.
25 For an early, and sophisticated analysis, see C Carman, J Mitchell and R Johns, “The unfortunate
natural experiment in ballot design: the Scottish Parliament elections of 2007”, presented at the EPOP
group of the Political Studies Association, 2007, Bristol, England.
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Table 2. Lowest and Highest Level of Rejected Ballots in Scottish
Parliament Election 2007 (constituency races)
Stirling 1.90%
Eastwood 2.29%




Sturgeon MSP, whose campaign was notable for its exhaustive voter-information
efforts, with an attendant low ballot rejection rate. Be that as it may, however, such
factors do not explain the heightened rate of rejection as compared with 1999 and
2003. Enter Gould.
C. GOULD’S CRITIQUE
The Gould Report has much to recommend it, not least its rigorous focus on
delay as the central failing of the key players. Starting with the ill-considered
decision to make a major change to the electoral system less than twelve months
before polling day, delay affected all aspects of the timing and preparation of the
election. It is remarkable that, even as late as 19 December 2006, the Electoral
Commission was drawing the Scotland Office’s attention to the fact that key provisions
in the Parliamentary Order (relating to the combination of elections) still required
re-drafting.26 With the Scottish Parliament (Elections etc) Order not coming into
force until 14 March 2007, the implementation was only ever likely to contribute
“to an air of uncertainty among all the stakeholders involved”27 making it
“difficult . . . to meet subsequent deadlines relating to the printing and distribution
of the ballot paper”.28 Most damningly (and not accounted for in the figures given
above), these delays “quite probably contributed to disenfranchising a number of
postal voters, who may not have received or been able to return their ballot papers on
time.”29 The report continued:30
Across Scotland, 5,413 parliamentary postal ballot papers (1.24% of those issued) and 5,204
local government ballot papers (1.2%) were too late to be included in the count. In three
areas, the number of late ballot papers exceeded 5% of postal ballot papers issued.
These are remarkable figures, revealing the price electors paid for political
incompetence. For this the report is not slow to attribute responsibility:31
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[I]t became clear that both the Scotland Office and the Scottish Executive were frequently
focused on partisan political interests in carrying out their responsibilities, overlooking voter
interests and operational realities within the electoral administration timetable.
“What is characteristic of 2007”, the report added, “was a notable level of party self
interest evident in Ministerial decision-making (especially in regard to the timing and
method of counts and the design of ballot papers).”32 As a result, “months of partisan
political discussion and debate wasted valuable time which could otherwise have been
used to establish a ballot paper which all voters could easily understand.”33
On the question of single transfer votes and their potential for causing voter
confusion, Gould concludes that the combination of voting systems on 3 May was
not responsible for the higher rejection rates in the Scottish Parliament elections, but
rather, that “[t]here is very strong evidence to suggest that the combined Scottish
parliamentary ballot sheet was the main cause of this problem.”34 It should be noted
that the “very strong evidence” is the review’s own analysis of the rejected ballot
paper images – details of which are at Appendix D of the Report. Whilst space does
not permit this paper to scrutinise that analysis, its methodology and findings are
deserving of further attention.
An additional cause of voter confusion was the use of party descriptions on
the ballot paper – “sloganisation” in the language of the report. For example,
the practice of adopting “Alex Salmond for First Minister” (similarly deployed by
Margo MacDonald and Tommy Sheridan) to gain a favourable position on the ballot
paper reportedly confused voters.35 The Electoral Commission will be launching a
consultation on the issue of such descriptions in the course of this year.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The above has sought to contextualise and summarise a detailed account of a complex
episode. Space has not permitted consideration of numerous important issues to
which Gould rightly applied his mind, such as the critical role of returning officers,
and their recruitment, training and lines of reporting.36 Similarly thoughtful are the
remarks on legislative and administrative practicality and the important suggestion
that no new legislation comes into effect in the six months prior to polling day.37
This is not to suggest that the report be swallowed whole – certain findings appear
to be the product of (Canadian) cultural path dependency. For instance, the creation
of a Chief Returning Officer for Scotland, responsible for the hiring and training of
returning officers, the administration of elections, the public information campaign
and much else besides, would generate a permanent bureaucracy somewhat at




35 At 45, 56.
36 At 25-27.
37 At 112.
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obviously more effective. Other suggestions seem under-argued, such as the “strong
recommendation” against e-voting in 2011 (as recommended by Arbuthnott), on
the basis that there were problems with e-counting.38 These are entirely separate
technologies and to run them together is curious. Indeed, the report appears to have
something of a technological blind spot, with the impact of new technologies (in voter
information in particular) barely gaining a mention. Standing in a sports hall in the
middle of the night waiting for results is another cultural practice on which Gould was
not overly keen, calling for the abolition of overnight counts. Given that the fatigue
resulting from this practice very nearly resulted in the list decision being wrongly
called by the returning officer for the Highlands and Islands in 2007, a bit of cultural
insensitivity may, perhaps, be a good thing on occasion.
The initial response to the report from the latest Secretary of State for Scotland
appears to accept the wisdom of de-coupling the Scottish Parliament and local
government elections, and of returning to separate ballot papers. Rightly, the
possibility of a Chief Returning Officer for Scotland is to be given consideration.39
The knottier question of legislative competence is of course left to be battled over
between the governments at Holyrood and Westminster.
As to questions of constitutional governance, electoral law is foremost amongst
those areas where the capacity for political self-dealing is greatest, and most
damaging. The Gould Report does not accept that such practices were present in
the instant case, but nor is it able to reassure us as to their absence. The Scottish
Parliament elections of 2007 will long carry the connotation of politicians-as-hacks.
The task of restoring confidence (and competence) must now be a priority.
Navraj Singh Ghaleigh
University of Edinburgh
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Planning for Aquaculture
Recent years have seen a prolonged process of planning law reform in Scotland,
culminating in the Planning etc (Scotland) Act 2006. While most of that Act has yet to
be brought into force, provisions already in force1 have implications for the landmark
case of Argyll and Bute District Council v Secretary of State for Scotland2 and change
the limits of local authorities’ jurisdiction in relation to planning. This note describes
the process which resulted in an extension of planning controls to aquaculture in
Scotland and considers the implications of the change.
38 At 120.
39 HC Deb 23 Oct 2007, cols 165 ff.
1 Relevant parts of s 3, pertaining specifically to marine fish farming, and the whole of s 4 were commenced
on 1 April 2007 by the Planning etc (Scotland) Act 2006 (Commencement No 2) Order 2007, SSI
2007/130.
2 1976 SC 248.
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A. ARGYLL AND BUTE DISTRICT COUNCIL v SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR SCOTLAND
In Argyll and Bute District Council v Secretary of State for Scotland, which
concerned the construction of fixed moorings on the bed of Loch Fyne, the Second
Division held that planning jurisdiction was restricted to the area above the low
water mark of tidal waters. Lord Justice-Clerk Wheatley was prepared to accept
that the general jurisdiction of a local authority might extend below the low water
mark,3 but considered that an authority’s jurisdiction may not be the same for all
purposes. If the word “land”, defined in the Town and Country Planning (Scotland)
Act 1972 as including land covered with water, were to be taken to include land
covered by seawater, not cut off at any point, it would logically cover the extremes
to which jurisdiction could be stretched. Lord Wheatley could not imagine “that
the planning code has been extended by Parliament to that extent”, and such a
proposition seemed, contrary to the concept of town and country planning. In the
court’s opinion, therefore, the inference to be drawn from the 1972 Act was that
the terminus of the jurisdiction was the low water mark.
At the time, Himsworth doubted whether this view of the territorial limitations on
planning powers was universally accepted.4 Young did not think that an extension of
the jurisdiction to activities below low water mark was contrary to the general purpose
of town and country planning.5 He noted that development carried out below low
water mark would almost always be subject to some form of control – in particular,
the need for the consent of the Crown Estate Commissioners. Such control, however,
generally lacks any democratic element, and the considerations taken into account
by the bodies exercising it are less likely to be as wide-ranging as those which can
properly concern a planning authority. Notwithstanding these concerns, however, the
point was not further tested, and the decision in Argyll and Bute District Council
came to be treated as settled law.
B. EXTENSION OF PLANNING REGIME TO AQUACULTURE
Aquaculture is growing faster than any other means of animal food production
worldwide and is expected to double in the next two decades.6 In Europe alone, the
output of marine fish farming has developed a thousand-fold since 1970, and, within
the European Union, the United Kingdom is the largest producer of farmed and shell
fish, with ninety per cent coming from Scotland.7 In this respect, aquaculture makes
3 It was argued for the planning authority that, since the solum of Loch Fyne below low water mark
(in which the Crown had vested rights both patrimonial and fiduciary) formed part of the realm, it fell
within the jurisdiction of the appropriate local authority and, accordingly, of the appropriate planning
authority.
4 C M G Himsworth, “The limits of the planning realm” [1977] JPL 21.
5 E Young, “Planning jurisdiction in Scotland” (1977) 42 JLSS 22, 61 at 62.
6 M Holm et al, The Environmental Status of Norwegian Aquaculture (The Bellona Foundation, report
7:2003; available at http://www.bellona.org/reports/Norwegian_Aquaculture).
7 The Fisheries Research Services estimate there are 280 active marine salmon and 332 active shellfish
farms in Scotland: see Scottish Fish Farms Annual Production Survey 2005.
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an important contribution to Scotland’s rural economy, providing significant numbers
of jobs, often where alternative employment opportunities are scarce.8
A proprietary right in the sea bed within the limits of the territorial waters is vested
in the Crown, and therefore the Crown Estate must provide a lease before a fish farm
can operate.9 This has resulted in a dual role for the Crown Estate Commissioners, as
the owner of the sea bed and also as the regulator of marine fish farming development.
Concerns were increasingly expressed about whether, in considering applications for
fish farm developments, sufficient attention was being paid to potentially conflicting
uses and environmental impacts. The lack of a democratic element in the decision-
making processes was also criticised.10 The solution was to extend planning controls
to marine fish farming. This intention was first announced by the then Scottish Office
Minister, Lord Sewel in November 1997. At that time, however, it could not have
been envisaged that it would take ten years to be put in to practice.11
In July 2000, the Scottish Executive consulted on the extension of planning
controls to marine and shellfish farming.12 Three main themes emerged from the
responses: concern from the industry, support from other bodies, and the role of
fish farming in the economy.13 Overall, however, the broad principle was considered
acceptable, although it was clear that the detail needed to be worked through.14
Enabling powers to bring marine fish farms into the land use planning system for
transitional water and coastal water were included, by amendment, in the Water
Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003.15 The necessary framework
having been established, work then began on the detail. An extensive round of con-
sultations by the Scottish Executive was followed by lobbying on behalf of inter-
ested parties, particularly the aquaculture industry, environmentalists and the wild
salmon sector. Over this period too, the views relating to regulation and protection
of the marine environment began to change, with calls coming from many quarters
favouring the development of a comprehensive marine act.16
The political commitment having been made, work continued on the
implementation. The aim was to provide a system of planning control for aquaculture
8 Scottish Executive, Scottish Planning Policy: Planning for Fish Farming (SPP 22, 2007; available at
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2007/03/29102058/0).
9 Crown Estate Commissioners v Fairlie Yacht Slip Ltd 1976 SC 161.
10 M G Lloyd, “A strategic approach to fish farming in the UK?” (1990) 31 Scottish Planning Law and
Practice 67.
11 An interim scheme was introduced in 2000 which enabled the relevant local authorities to comment on
proposed marine fish farm developments. The planning authorities developed non-statutory framework
plans to provide a policy context for decision-making.
12 Scottish Executive Development Department, The Extension of Planning Controls to Marine Fish
Farms and Shellfish Farming (2000).
13 Scottish Executive Development Department, The Extension of Planning Controls to Marine Fish
Farming: Analysis of Responses (2001).
14 A M Slater, “Planning for Scottish aquaculture: the story thus far” (2005) 16 Water Law 122.
15 Section 24(2) (a) amends the definition of “development” in section 26(6) of the 1997 Act to include fish
farming in coastal waters and transitional water. The relevant sections of the 2003 Act were commenced
by the Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003 (Commencement No 5) Order
2007, SSI 2007/50, and came into force on 31 March 2007.
16 See for example Slater (n 14) at 127-128.
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which was as close as possible to the existing system for land-based regulation,
but which accommodated the differences of the marine location. This proved
to be a prolonged and somewhat difficult process. The Scottish Executive sought
to be inclusive and open in its consultation,17 but views on some key aspects were
polarised.18 Examination of the emerging proposals highlighted legal problems and
an entrenching of views by stakeholders.19 A fresh opportunity for legislation was
provided by the Planning etc (Scotland) Act 2006. Although parliamentary discussion
was limited, MSPs generally accepted that the extension of the planning regime to
fish farming should be to the twelve nautical miles limit.20 The Act also recognised
that a change of species of fish within an existing fish farm, which might not require
any change in equipment, could lead to environmental impacts and so should be the
subject of planning control.21
The Scottish Executive continued to refine the processes and procedures, and to
consult key stakeholders, right up until aquaculture became part of the planning
system on 1 April 2007.22 The effect is that all new fish farms, or modifications to
exiting ones, require planning permission from the appropriate local authority. All
coastal local authorities have been divided into marine planning zones extending to
three nautical miles, with each designated as the planning authority for the purposes
of marine fish farming within a particular zone.23 The jurisdiction of planning
authorities has thus been extended beyond the low water mark for the first time,
but only in the limited circumstances of fish farming.
In practice, only planning authorities on the west coast and Northern Isles
are affected.24 Furthermore, it is anticipated that the aquaculture industry will
increasingly be typified by larger but fewer farms.25 It is therefore not expected
that the number of applications for new fish farm sites will be high.26 There also
17 Scottish Executive Development Department, Extending Planning Controls to Marine Fish Farming
and Defining Marine Boundaries for Fish Farming (2007).
18 For example, Scottish Executive Development Department, Extending Planning Controls to Marine
Fish Farming and Defining Marine Boundaries for Fish Farming (2007) para 18.
19 Slater (n 14).
20 Planning etc (Scotland) Act 2006 s 3(1), amending the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997
s 26. It is anticipated that Ministers will consult on the boundaries between the 3 and 12 nautical mile
limit in due course, but due to the current technical state of the fish farming industry, it is unlikely that
applications for planning permission between will be lodged within this area in the near future.
21 Planning etc (Scotland) Act 2006 s 3(1), amending the Town and Country Planning (Scotland)
Act 1997 s 26.
22 The Town and Country Planning (Marine Fish Farming) (Scotland) Order 2007, SSI 2007/268 came
into force 1 April 2007 (other than art 13 which came into force on 2 April 2007).
23 Town and Country Planning (Marine Fish Farming) (Scotland) Order 2007 art 5.
24 These are: Argyll and Bute, Dumfries and Galloway, Highland, North Ayrshire, Orkney Isles, Shetland
Isles, Western Isles, and Loch Lomond and the Trossachs National Park. Scottish Ministers introduced
a presumption against aquaculture development on the north and east coasts in 1999 to safeguard
migratory fish species.
25 Scottish Executive, Planning for Fish Farming (n 8).
26 Research by Mr Ole W Pedersen on behalf of the author in September 2007 indicates that only
Highland Council and Shetland Island Council have received applications for new farms under the
new regime. Argyll and Bute have received one application for a change of species from finfish to
shellfish.
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remains the issue of the incorporation of all the existing fish farms into the planning
regime. A point of great contention in the consultation phase,27 this appears to have
been resolved reasonably satisfactorily. ScottishMinisters will decide whether existing
fish farms can continue to operate. A non-statutory advisory panel is in the process
of being established and all pre-1999 fish farms will go through a review process
and all post-1999 farms will be audited.28 In coming to a decision as to whether to
grant planning permission, the Scottish Ministers will consider the likely impact of
the development on any European site29 and the environment generally, as well as
any other relevant planning matter. It is anticipated that most farms will be granted
planning permission, with appropriate environmental or other conditions. The panel
is expected to commence work towards the end of 2007.
The development of planning law on aquaculture has not been an isolated
phenomenon. Recent years have seen an almost bewildering plethora of initiatives,
strategies and pilot projects on the marine environment.30 The rhetoric and
policy development on its governance has, however, come a long way. The report
on Safeguarding Our Seas: A Strategy for the Conservation and Sustainable
Development of our Maine Environment31 sets out the UK government’s vision
for “clear, healthy, safe, productive and biologically diverse seas” and describes a
long-term strategy for the conservation and sustainable development of the marine
environment. Furthermore, in Scotland, the Executive produced a paper in 2005
entitled Seas the Opportunity: A Strategy for the Long Term Sustainability of
Scotland’s Coasts and Seas,32 while in 2007 the UK Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs published A Sea Change: a Marine Bill White Paper.33 It
is expected that a draft marine bill will be published by UK government, and the
Scottish government has promised a marine bill to cover devolved matters.34 Marine
spatial planning has been central to all these developments and will become the
accepted regulatory regime for development beyond the low water mark.35
27 Slater (n 14) at 128.
28 The difference in treatment is because post-1999 farms were already required to satisfy the
requirements of the Environmental Impact Assessment (Fish Farming in Marine Waters) Regulations
1999, SI 1999/367.
29 Within the meaning of the Conservation (Natural Habitats etc) (Scotland) Regulations 1994,
SI 1994/2716, reg 10.
30 Scottish Parliament, Environment and Rural Development Committee, Report on Inquiry into
the Marine Environment (SP Paper 774, 2007; available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/
business/committees/environment/reports-07/rar07-04-00.htm) col 5.
31 http://www.defra.gov.uk/Environment/water/marine/uk/stewardship/index.htm.
32 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2005/08/26102543/25444. It announced the establishment of
an Advisory Group on Marine Spatial Strategy to provide better leadership and good governance in
Scotland’s marine area.
33 Cm 7047; available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/consult/marinebill-whitepaper07/marinebill-
whitepaper.pdf.
34 Mr Richard Lochhead, Rural Affairs and Environment Cabinet Secretary, announced on 19 July
2007 that the Scottish Government would produce a Marine Bill: see www.scotland.gov.uk/News/
Releases/2007/06/19112631.
35 A M Slater, “A Marine Act: implications for Scotland” (2007) 18 Water Law 5.
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C. CONCLUSION
The rather tortuous implementation of the political pledge to incorporate aquaculture
into the planning regime has now been completed. The result is somewhat
incongruous as, although planning, or indeed land-use planning as it is often
described, has been extended into the Scottish marine environment for the first time,
it is aquaculture, alone in that environment, which is part of the planning regime.
Decisions will be considered in the context of the development plan, with affected
planning authorities being required to incorporate appropriate policies into their new
plans. These development plans can, however, only deal with aquaculture, and the
isolation of fish farms within a swathe of other regulatory regimes does not suggest a
decision-making process which is properly integrated.
This important, if somewhat clumsy, change may be short-lived. If, as is
anticipated, marine spatial planning is introduced as a regulatory regime for Scotland’s
coasts and seas, aquaculture will become part of that more comprehensive system.
The late Lord Wheatley would perhaps have disapproved of the extension of the
planning regime beyond the low water mark, even for development which is so clearly
marine in nature. The transfer of aquaculture to the planning system, however, may
yet be regarded as the vanguard of marine spatial planning in Scotland.
Anne-Michelle Slater
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